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BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE SHORT, HAPPY LIFE OF
THE LAW AND SOCIETY MOVEMENT
DAVID M. TRUBEK*
The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Meeting of the Law and Society Asso-
ciation: The Ice Cream Social
The family has returned to Madison, Wisconsin where it all started.
The old-timers are in a mood for celebration and self-congratulation.
The past presidents are serving ice cream to a huge crowd of people
from all over the world. These founding fathers (the first female
president is still in office and isn't yet eligible to serve ice cream)
look pleased. This is a world they have made. It is full of old friends,
recent students, ardent disciples, a few critics who have at least taken
them seriously, and some strangers who (probably) know who they
are. To each and all they scoop out free ice cream made by the
University of Wisconsin and paid for by the association they
struggled to create.
It is a charming scene: modest (no caviar, no champagne), friendly
(with each cone a kind word or two to all), egalitarian (one scoop for
each). For a moment, everyone forgets the world outside. Put aside
are the scars the family members bear from the struggle to create and
maintain this curious project. There have been disappointments,
frustrations, no little rage. Some thought they would make brilliant
careers in law and other disciplines, only to encounter hostility and
indifference. Some thought they would be able to mobilize the
money that is needed for empirical research, only to find that
funding sources can be indifferent to scholarship that doesn't
support conclusions already reached. Some thought students would
be fascinated by the insights they could offer on the role of law in
society, only to find that the students wanted tips on how to pick
juries. Some expected to reform American society through law, only
to find America wanted little reform and thought it had too much
law. But at the ice cream social, all these disappointments could be
put aside. The family had survived, and that was enough.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW'
T HIS ESSAY is a story and a polemic. The "story" is my view of
the origins of the law and society movement. I wrote it-at the
Voss-Bascom Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Legal Studies, University of
Wisconsin-Madison.
1. This Article is dedicated to my colleagues in the Institute for Legal Studies, who taught
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invitation of the Florida State University College of Law-to celebrate
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Law and Society Association. I call
it a "story" because it is more than a memoir and less than a history.
The "polemic" is my effort to suggest a path the movement might
take in the coming years. I call this essay a "polemic" because it is
more than a prediction: it is a call for new directions. 2
A. A New Object of Knowledge
My story deals with the history and fate of an idea, and the institu-
tions constructed around it. The idea is that law is an object that can
be studied by the social sciences: I call this the "law and society
idea." The institutions are the Law and Society Association and other
organizations set up to further the study of law as a social phenome-
non. In this story there is a group I sometimes call the "law and soci-
ety movement." These are the people committed to the idea and
involved in the institutions.
me most of what I know about "law and society." It draws on earlier work I did with John
Esser, and I acknowledge his invaluable assistance in a long project which hopefully has come to
its end with the publication of this Essay. Lisa Bower, Elizabeth Chambliss, John Esser, and
Lois Johnson assisted in various stages of the research.
This Article originated as the 1989 Mason Ladd Lecture at the Florida State University
College of Law. Responses to the lecture by Felice Levine, Bryant Garth, Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, and faculty and students at FSU helped me refine the argument. I received valuable
comments on later drafts from Elizabeth Chambliss, John Esser, Dirk Hartog, Bill Felstiner,
Marc Galanter, Alan Hunter, Stewart Macaulay, Austin Sarat, John Henry Schlegel, Vicki
Schultz, Amy Trubek, and Louise Trubek.
I have benefited from work-in-progress by Yves Dezalay, Austin Sarat, and Susan Silbey on
the history of the sociology of law in America. Their project parallels my own: I have been
influenced by their ideas and stimulated by a discussion of their project at the Institute for Legal
Studies' Colloquium in November 1989. Their comments and that discussion gave me additional
information on the history of law and society which I have incorporated in the final text.
This Essay draws heavily on my observations as a participant in the law and society move-
ment, and I have included "stories" from personal experience. I am indebted to my colleague
Patricia Williams for showing me how personal narrative can be employed in scholarly argu-
ment. Only I am responsible for errors and omissions.
- 2. This Essay can be seen as the completion of a project I began with the publication of
Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575
(1984) [hereinafter Where the Action Is]. The goal of the project was to rethink the law and
society tradition in light of critical legal studies, feminism, and post-structuralist social theory.
Other products of this project include Trubek & Esser, Critical Empiricism in American Legal
Studies: Paradox, Program, or Pandora's Box, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 3 (1989); Trubek, Max
Weber's Tragic Modernism and the Study of Law in Society, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 573 (1986)
[hereinafter Max Weber's Tragic Modernism]; Trubek, Review Essay: Radical Theory and Pro-
grammatic Thought, 95 Am. J. Soc. 447 (1989); and Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On
Reading and Using the Newer Sociology of Civil Procedure, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. I 11
(1988) [hereinafter Handmaiden's Revenge]. Many of the themes in this Essay were originally set
forth in those articles. My call for new directions rests on the analysis developed through this
project and my political commitment to a more communitarian, egalitarian society free of race
and gender hierarchies.
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When I speak of the "law and society idea," I mean the reconcep-
tualization of law in ways that make it amenable to study by the social
sciences. If we think of law only as a set of rules or principles, the
social sciences have little to offer legal studies. Accordingly, if law is
to be examined by the social sciences, it has to be redefined. We have
to think of law as a social institution, as interacting behaviors, as rit-
ual and symbol, as a reflection of interest group politics, as a form of
behavior modification, or in some other way that makes it amenable
to social scientific analysis.
What I call the "law and society idea" may sound prosaic, but it
was once the banner of a fighting faith. It was not easy to get people
to stop thinking about law as command, rule, or doctrine and start
thinking about it as system, symbol, and behavior. It took creative
intellectual work to develop this idea and immense energy to form in-
stitutions committed to it. Because these efforts succeeded, the law
and society idea no longer sounds radical: in some sense, we are all
law and society scholars today.
This "law and society idea" is not the only way to think about the
relationship between law and the social sciences. Lawyers have spoken
of this relationship for a long time. Roscoe Pound first issued his call
for a "sociological jurisprudence" in 1910.1 Lawyers' views about the
alliance with the social disciplines have varied: some have thought that
lawyers could use social science instrumentally, others that law might
become a social science. 4 The idea that law can be studied by the so-
cial sciences is just one of the "law and . . . " visions that has been
mooted in this century and circulates in academic circles today. The
law and society movement made this idea its project.5
My story recounts the origins and discusses the fate of this project.
It describes the development of a new domain of social knowledge. It
places law and society in context, showing the impact of legal culture
and political developments on the idea and the movement. 6
3. See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12 (1910) (urging the
grounding of legal analysis in sociology). Pound fully developed the idea of sociological juris-
prudence in his article, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1-3), 24
HAv. L. REv. 591 (1911), 25 HAv. L. REv. 140 (1911), 25 HARv. L. Rv. 489 (1912).
4. For a discussion of these various views, see generally Laswell & MacDougal, Legal Edu-
cation and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YAE L. J. 203 (1943).
5. For a clear statement of this vision, see Galanter, The Legal Malaise; Or, Justice Ob-
served, 19 LAW & Soc'y Rav. 537 (1985) (discussing the various methods and results of studying
law in action).
6. My account, based in large measure on personal experience and conversations with col-
leagues, is general and provisional. The full context includes the role lawyers play in society; the
nature of the legal academy, legal theory, and legal culture; and political developments. I have
sketched some of these elements, but this Essay is still just a story, not the full-blown social and
intellectual history of the law and society field that is needed.
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B. Knowledge for Whom?
A domain of social knowledge is socially constructed, and the vari-
ous knowledges that result serve the purposes and further the projects
of social groups. 7 My story is about a bunch of people who got to-
gether to create a new social discipline called "law and society." They
produced some knowledge and have been able to continue doing so.
The questions are: How did they succeed in defining a new domain of
inquiry? What forces supported their efforts? What interests were
served?
To answer these questions, one must have some idea of the struc-
ture within which this domain of knowledge exists. For this purpose, I
draw on a recent article in which authors Yves Dezalay, Austin Sarat,
and Susan Silbey describe the social structure of "the sociology of
law" in America.8 They suggest that through the law schools, the legal
profession exercises a dominant influence on the production of aca-
demic knowledge about law. 9 In this argument, the authors posit that
the law schools serve the interests of the profession, and the social
sciences are largely "intellectual subcontractors" to legal academics. ' 0
There is much truth to this argument. I agree that the law schools
play a dominant role in shaping legitimate knowledge about law in
America, and tend to reflect and protect the interests of the legal pro-
fession-particularly its elites. Therefore, in my story I use elements
from the Dezalay, Sarat, and Silbey argument, and pay special atten-
tion to the relationship between the law and society "idea" and devel-
opments in legal thought and education. Some critics may think that
this approach downplays the important and independent role of social
scientists in constructing this domain of knowledge. I recognize this
limitation. Others may think the structural account is not only an
overstatement of the historical importance of the legal academy, but is
also reductionist and determinist. Again, I see this danger and have
tried to leave room for contingency and agency in my story of the
construction of law and society as a social discipline."
These qualifications, however, do not affect my basic conclusion:
from the beginning, the interests of the legal academy strongly influ-
7. See generally M. FOUCAUILT, POWER/KNowLEDoE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRrnNos (C. Gordon ed. 1980).
8. Dezalay, Sarat & Silbey, D'Une Demarche Contestaire A Un Savoir Meritocratique:
Elements Pour Une Histoire Sociale De La Sociologie Juridique Americaine, 78 AcTES DE LA
RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SocLLas 79, 80-81 (1989) [hereinafter Dezalay].
9. Id. at 83.
10. Id. at 84 (quoting A. HUNT, THE SOCIOLOoICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW 145 (1978)).
11. In this sense, I may be departing from the stronger structuralism of the Dezalay, Sarat,
and Silbey account.
1990]
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enced th law and society idea. While the law and society movement
succeeded in creating a new object of study and a new domain of
knowledge, it did so within a "legally-constructed" domain. Thus,
law and society knowledge, while different from the traditional
knowledges produced in the legal academy, necessarily reflects the
needs and interests of legal elites.
C. Politics
This conclusion affects my views on the political significance of the
law and society idea. Initially, this idea was linked to a progressive
political agenda. This agenda reflected the views and needs of the le-
gal elites of the time, people committed to moderate reform. While
law and society never thought of itself as "political," it had an im-
plicit programmatic vision which resonated with the projects of liberal
lawyers.
The movement took shape in the 1960's. People came to law and
society with different motives and different politics, but by and large
all were "liberals" as that term was understood at the time. 2 To be a
liberal in the late 1950's and early 1960's meant favoring a stronger
role for the state in the economy, moderate redistribution of income,
state action to improve the lot of the disadvantaged, legal protection
for the accused and mentally ill, and legal bans on racial discrimina-
tion. If you were a man and thought about the issue (which was rare),
you probably wanted to improve the status of women: If you were a
woman (and there were a few female scholars among the founders of
law and society), you certainly did.' 3
In the early years, law and society knowledge fostered reform ef-
forts including the civil rights movement, the War on Poverty, and the
rights expansion of the Warren Court. 4 Because it allied itself with a
political "project" which sought, in Herbert Croly's phrase, to fulfill
"the promise of American life,"' 5 the movement started as more than
12. This interpretation was originally suggested by William Simon of the Stanford Law
School. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. Rav. 763, 778 (1986). For
discussions of the relationship between law and society and "liberalism," see Galanter, supra
note 5, at 538-42; Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate
Persistance of a Research Tradition, 9 LEG. STUD. FORUM 23, 26-27 (1985); White, From Real-
ism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819, 830-36 (1986).
13. Sources indicating the political climate of the United States in 1960's include D. HAL-
BEESTAm, THE BEST AND TiE BRiGHTS (1969); P. Novix, THAT NomnIa DRAM (1988); TowARD
NEw HuMAN Rions: Tam SociAL Poucnis oF Ta KENNaDY AND JOHNSON ADmNSTRATIONS (D.
Warner ed. 1977).
14. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
15. H. CROLY, THE PROMISE oF AjmacAN Lwn 2-7 (1909).
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a purely "academic" discipline. In addition to seeking a new form of
knowledge, law and society scholars were committed to uncovering
various forms of inequality and injustice in American life and correct-
ing them.
D. Legalism
Most law and- society founders were liberals; some were also what I
shall call "legalists." By "legalists" I mean persons having a faith in
law as an instrument of progressive social change. Legalists believed
that most of the "flaws" in American society could and would be
corrected through legal means. They had faith in the immanent liber-
alism of legal institutions and equated "law" with "freedom" and
"equality." They recognized that at some times and in some places
the law would hamper full realization of liberal ideals, but saw such
situations as anomalous, inconsistent with the fundamental spirit of
the law, and correctable. In this vision they believed that with time
and hard work, the inherent liberalism of the law would work itself
pure. Legalists saw law as a tool to be used by liberal reformers: when
liberal analysis revealed a gap between reality and legalist ideals, they
believed there existed a legal way to close the gap. 6
Certainly, not all law and society pioneers were legalists. Indeed,
from the very beginning, law and society scholars expressed reserva-
tions about legalism, questioning assumptions about the immanent
liberalism of the law and its power to change social life. 7 Thus there
was always tension between law and society and what I call "legal-
ism."
But the existence of skepticism about legalism did not diminish the
appeal of the liberal reform project to the law. and society movement.
Whether they embraced legalism or questioned it, early law and soci-
ety scholars could find a place within the liberal legalist reform pro-
grams of the 1960's. The legalists in the movement would perfect the
immanent rationality of the law or expand its instrumental sweep,
while those who questioned these assumptions could develop their
16. Legalism was inherent in the "gap studies" characteristic of law and society scholar-
ship. See Sarat, supra note 12, at 24-25. These studies exposed discrepancies betw en legal norms
and social behavior. The implication was that better laws or more effective implementation
would close the gap. Id. at 27-28.
17. See, e.g., L. FRDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL ScIEN Es (1969).
The material on the limits of legal effectiveness (ch. 3) points out various barriers to liberal
legalism and suggests ambivalence toward the "legalist" approach. The articles in that section
analyze various individual and institutional factors which limit the impact of law on society.
19901
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skeptical insights by studying the gap between liberal reform ideals
and social reality.
E. The Decline of Liberalism
Today it all seems different. Liberalism as we understood it has
waned: conservative pundits and politicians have turned "liberalism"
into a dirty word. And doubts about legalism have spread: In part
because of the work of the law and society movement, we no longer
necessarily see law as the embodiment of reason or as a powerful tool
for the good. These doubts have influenced the law and society move-
ment which, like the nation as a whole, has come to doubt both law
and reform.
The emergence of these doubts raises a new set of questions about
the law and society project, and the alliance between lawyers and the
social sciences on which this enterprise rests. These questions may be
answered by the following analogy. Matthew Arnold once suggested
that nations go through periods of expansion and concentration. 8 In
periods of expansion, citizens are open to new ideas and ready to
tackle new challenges. In periods of concentration, however, citizens
look to their past for sources of stability and common values.' 9
In this sense, the story of the law and society movement is the his-
tory of an enterprise which was born in an era of expansion, but has
come of age in a period of concentration. Lawyers and social scien-
tists started working together in an epoch in which they both believed
that their work contributed to the liberal project of social reform
though legal means. If that project no longer exists, what is the basis
for the alliance?
F. Plan of the Essay
That is the issue this Essay addresses. As the Association celebrates
its silver anniversary, the law and society movement is reexamining its
purpose and rethinking its institutional strategy. The problems it faces
come not from a shortage of answers, but rather from a plethora of
contradictory and incompatible ones. Numerous prophets can chart
paths for the coming years, but these various paths will point in diver-
gent directions. What direction should the movement take?
To answer this question, we have to start by going back to the roots
of law and society. We have to understand the intellectual context in
18. M. AxNOLD, The Function of Criticism at the Present Time, in EssAYS iN CurrLcxsM 17
(1st ser. 1895).
19. Id.
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which the movement arose and presently functions, as well as the
complex motives that led to its creation. In Part II, I describe that
context, showing how legal thought moved toward the idea of the so-
cial scientific study of law. In Part III, I speculate on the motives of
various actors who formed the movement and describe the "original
understanding" which held this diverse group together. Part IV traces
the gradual development and refinement of the law and society idea as
problems with the original understanding became clear and a new vi-
sion emerged to replace it. In Part V, I set the stage for a polemical
argument about law and society's future by describing the current
context of legal studies and the constraints and possibilities it con-
tains. Finally, in Part VI, I set forth my views on the future of the
movement.
Dreams of Youth: Lawyers and Architects
When I was in college, I admired Frank Lloyd Wright and wanted to
become an architect. I was attracted to the idea of designing grand
structures of great symbolic power-as well as to the image of the
architect as hero. I liked Vitruvius' formula for a good building:
firmness, commodity, delight. Alas, I seemed to have little talent for
drawing and design, and no aptitude for math and engineering. But
then I discovered the Law, and that seemed an attractive second best.
I told people I wanted to become a lawyer because lawyers were
"social architects. " I took a course at the Wisconsin Law School on
law in society. Produced by legal realists Willard Hurst, Lloyd
Garrison, Carl Auerbach, and Sam Mermin, the course convinced
me that law was the place for a frustrated architect who couldn't
draw.2 Lawyers, I learned, designed institutions, not buildings. Like
architects, they used science-albeit social science, not physics and
mechanics-to design. They drew on a symbolic tradition, although
theirs was a tradition of ideals, not images. The institutions they
designed offered firmness, commodity, and even a little delight: Like
good buildings, legal institutions would create order, facilitate social
and economic development, and adorn the Republic. The lawyer,
like the architect, was a sort of hero: he (there were few "she's" then
in law or architecture) would advance the interests of all.
Ifound out that administrative agencies were the true solution for
complex social problems. I ran back to the the Wisconsin Student
Senate and proposed an administrative agency for some campus
problem. No one paid any attention.
20. See generally C. AUERBACH, L. GARi~soN, S. MEnwIN & W. HURST, THE LEoAL PROC-
ESs: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION-MAKING BY JuDICIAL, LEGisLATrvE, EXECUTI-E, AND ADmN-
ISTRATmVE AOENCIES (1961).
19%o]
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II. LEGAL STUDIES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT TO IMPERIAL LAW
Law and society emerged within the general context of legal studies
in the United States. Certainly, law and society pioneers had to strug-
gle to gain acceptance for the "law and society idea." They were, af-
ter all, creating a new object of knowledge, a task requiring them to
challenge much in the intellectual tradition fostered by the law schools
of their time. While the law and society story can be viewed as a rup-
ture in legal thought, it can also be seen as the continuation of trends
that go back at least to the Legal Realist epoch. This legal tradition
helped shape the new object and domain of knowledge that resulted
from the founders' efforts. Thus, before we turn to the story of the
law and society idea and movement, we must look at the context in
which it was formed. In this section, I analyze the general role of law
and legal thought in America and trace two traditions of legal thought
which affected law and society: Legal Realism, and a form of post-
Realist thought I call "Imperial Law." Law and society may have
been the offspring of Legal Realism, but it was born in the age of
Imperial Law.
A. Law, Legal Studies, and the Academy in American Life
1. Lawyers in Society
Let us begin by looking at the broadest aspect of American legal
studies-the role of law in American society. Legal studies are shaped
by the role law and lawyers play in our social, economic, and political
lives. When we examine the literature on this question, we find two
accounts: we might call them the lawyers' story and the critical scho-
lars' story. While these accounts overlap, they can be separated. 2 By
21. My analysis of the legal profession;s "official" and "critical" stories is inspired by the
work of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who uses the relational analysis of the "field" of law criti-
cally to examine the legal profession. Bourdieu, Toward a Reflexive Sociology, 7 Soc. THEORY
28 (1989) [hereinafter Reflexive Sociology]. Bourdieu's concept of "field" is a dynamic rela-
tional network. The constant struggle within the field to reconfigure the forces and to seek new
positions within its hierarchy defines the "habitus," or the practices, understandings, and cus-
toms specific to that field. Id. at 38-39. He sees the juridicial field (including lawyers, academics,
court personnel, etc.) as held together by the "magnetic" forces of universality, perceived com-
petence, autonomy, objectivity, and neutrality: These forces are perpetuated by the actors within
the juridical field and accepted by actors outside the field. Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward
a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINOs L. J. 805, 808 (1987) [hereinafter The Force of
Law]. The activities within the field are directed toward creating and representing the autonomy
and neutrality of law and lawyers to lay people. Id. at 844. Thus, an account of the legal profes-
sion and its relationship to the legal academy and the law and society movement should connect
[Vol. 18:1
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"the lawyers' story," I mean that account of the societal role of law
and the legal profession that is prevalent in legal elite circles. The criti-
cal scholars' story reflects on that account and seeks to explain it by
yet another view.
The lawyers' story is that the law has served as a mediating force in
American society. 2 From their beginnings, American social and legal
thought have recognized the issues of social, racial, and ethnic divi-
sion and stratification. Professional accounts of law, and to a lesser
degree, popular understandings, have portrayed the law as a mediat-
ing force in a society otherwise riven by divisiveness and conflict.
The ways in which law and the legal profession preserve their au-
tonomy from factions, classes, or racial groups have been explained in
very different accounts. Robert Gordon has identified three: (1) The
Whig-Federalist notion of the law as the embodiment of civic virtue,
and the lawyer as the equivalent of the Tocquevillian aristocrat; (2)
the nineteenth century Classical Liberal account of the law as a neu-
tral mechanism creating spheres of autonomy and restrictions on
power; and (3) the Progressive notion of law as a technical steering
mechanism. As different as these versions of the idea of law as a pub-
lic profession may be, they all contain the core notion that law is a
neutral force in a divided society, and lawyers the servants of the gen-
eral good, rather than agents of faction. 23
The critical scholars' story does not differ completely from the law-
yers' story. 24 The critical scholars recognize that people once thought
of the law as a mediating force in society, but they question whether it
was neutral.25 Whereas the lawyers' story treats neutrality or media-
tion as fact, the critical scholars see it as ideology. They assert that the
lawyers portray themselves as servants of the public, while actually
both the official and critical stories. For historical descriptions which refer to both accounts, see,
e.g., J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976); Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the
Age of American Enterprise 1870-1920, in PROFEsSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMER-
ICA 70 (G. Geison ed. 1983).
22. This view of law can be seen clearly in the official version of "professionalism" litera-
ture. For a description of that tradition, see Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L.
REv. 1 (1988).
23. Each account of professional autonomy centers on a different version of the notion of
lawyers' neutrality. The Whig-Federalist lawyer was credited with the neutrality of a statesman,
for the "gentleman-lawyer" was especially capable of prescribing the contours of the law for the
good of the republic. The Classical Liberal lawyer's neutrality derived from the disinterestedness
with which the lawyer dispatched the mediating role; the lawyer simply clarified the boundaries
between the individual and the state, whether in practice or rational law reform. Neutrality was
also the hallmark of the Progressive lawyer, whose technical expertise in the neutral domain of
policy science qualified the lawyer in the name of efficiency. Gordon, supra note 21, passim.
24. See generally J. AUERBACH, supra note 21.
25. M.LAsoN, THE RISE oF PROFESSIONALISM 168-71 (1977).
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behaving as agents of dominant groups. In this account, the idea of
neutrality is a mask, not a description.
My view is that the neutrality of law is more myth than reality, but
that the existence of this myth sometimes makes a difference. No one
can deny the force of the critical account: lawyers have tended to rep-
resent and speak for dominant interests in American society; the law
does tend to reflect the interests of the powerful. But American law is
complex and contradictory. The very need to present the law as neu-
tral creates the possibility that the interests of the weak and unorgan-
ized will at times find expression in legal doctrine and secure
protection by legal institutions. Thus moral entrepreneurs can seize
the ideology of neutrality and can employ the idea of the "public in-
terest" to champion unpopular causes and challenge power. 26
2. The Legal Academy and the Legal Profession
What role do the law schools and the profession play in preserving
the myth of legal neutrality? And how does this role affect legal schol-
arship in general, and law and society work in particular? Given my
view that the legal academy influenced the "law and society idea," we
have to understand academic law before we can fully understand the
law and society movement in legal studies. 27 To gain this understand-
ing, we must examine the restraints and opportunities in the context
of academic law.
(a) Professional Hegemony
Unquestionably, the legal academy reflects the interests of the legal
profession, particularly its elites. And since these elites are themselves
closely allied to the dominant groups in American society, the law
schools tend to defend the status quo. To this extent, I agree with the
hypotheses of Dezalay, Sarat, and Silbey.28 But because law and law-
yers play complex and contradictory roles in American society, and
the relationship between professional power and academic knowledge
is multi-dimensional and reciprocal, academic law is not merely a mir-
ror of the legal elite's visions or simply a mask for their self-interest or
26. Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in.the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of
Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 LAW & Soc'y REv. 529, 529-69 (1977).
27. I recognize that many law and society scholars do not work in law schools, and many
reject lawyers' professional paradigms. Nonetheless, law schools (and thus indirectly, the legal
profession) exercise a strong influence on law and society work: academic legal culture forms the
context within which socio-legal work in the United States has emerged and is sustained.
28. Dezalay, supra note 8, at 85-86.
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the interests of their powerful clients: 29 counter-hegemonic ideas can
arise.
(b) Objectivism
Academic law in America has a strong commitment to objectivism.
Objectivism has a substantive and an epistemological dimension. Sub-
stantively, it is the belief that behind the rules, statutes, and doctrines
of the legal system lies either a moral order (a rationally defensible
scheme of human association) or a realistic accommodation to the
constraints and limits of human existence.30 Epistemologically, objec-
tivism is the faith that legal institutions have available to them modes
of knowing and deciding that are independent of the interests of any
group, class, race, or faction.3 '
Both aspects of objectivism affect legal scholarship's self-under-
standing. Since legal scholarship is part of the process which reveals
the objective substance of the law, it must present itself as objective
knowledge. Thus, legal scholarship supports the myth of legal neutral-
ity: its presentation of law and legal solutions as the outcome of an
objective science (or a neutral technique) strengthens the law's claim
to be a mediating force.
The foundations for objectivism in legal studies have varied over
the years; as our culture changes, these foundations must be redes-
cribed. 32 The law schools thus devise new ways to describe and justify
the law as natural or neutral, and maintain the image of neutrality by
suppressing critical scholarship that might challenge the professional
story. 3  My story of the law and society idea illustrates this process.
(c) Room for Maneuver
While this structural account accurately describes the context of le-
gal studies, if taken too seriously it could lead us to conclude that all
29. Cf. The Force of Law, supra note 21, at 843-44 (positing that law and legal doctrines
reflect the ethical and political inclinations of those who apply them).
30. R. UNGER, TmE CRmcAL LEGAL STuDi.s MovEMENTr 2 (1986).
31. Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book Review), 76 CALrn. L. REv. 465, 503-04 (1988).
32. Gary Peller points out that successive challenges to the foundations of objectivity in
legal thought have simply redescribed-not dismantled-the claim to objectivity. The Legal
Realists challenged the formalists' foundation of "law from first principles" by asserting instead
that they could achieve objectivity through policy science. See Peller, The Metaphysics of Ameri-
can Law, 73 CALu. L. REv. 1151, 1152-1209, 1216-19, 1225-26 (1985). Post-Realist thinkers
(e.g., Law and Economics, Legal Process) claim that law can be made objective through neutral
goals and uncontroversial processes. See Singer, supra note 3 1, at 518-28.
33. Law schools do not suppress in some conscious or overt manner; rather, they simply
monopolize the field of legitimate knowledge about law by controlling all forms of legal studies.
Since law schools themselves are usually controlled by people who accept the official story, criti-
cal challenges-if they emerge at all-are marginalized and weakened. And as Bourdieu points
out, struggles within the "field" of legal scholarship serve to legitimate the social force of the
field itself. The Force of Law, supra note 21, at 852.
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scholarship about law will celebrate the status quo and emphasize the
interests of the legal profession and the elite groups with which it is
allied. But we know this is not the case: even if critical thought is
often marginalized in legal studies, it exists.
There are several reasons why the structural account fails to explain
fully what occurs. First, it suggests that the law schools are completely
dependent on the profession, so that professional interests, including
interests in the production of a legitimating ideology, will always
dominate. In fact, law schools and the legal profession exist in a rela-
tionship of reciprocal interdependence. Granted, the law schools do
depend heavily on the profession,3 4 but the academy is also important
for the profession. Academic knowledge is the basis for lawyers'
claims to exclusive competence, status, and income: the schools pro-
duce the legitimating knowledges and certifications necessary to main-
tain these claims. To accomplish this task, the law schools must be
seen as independent of the profession and part of the university. To
the extent-and it is limited-that universities encourage autonomous
and critical thought, legal academics interested in a critical approach
to law and practice can find "space" and support for their ventures.
Additionally, the legal profession is not unified; it is divided along
lines of income, status, and affiliation with client base." While power
within the profession correlates with the power of the clients lawyers
serve, that power is not total and the correlation is not perfect. Legal
educators can form alliances with, and seek support from, deviant
groups within the profession. The existence of professional counter-
cultures may support counterhegemomic enclaves within the legal
academy.36
34. While this point seems obvious, a few words on the relationship are in order. Unlike
law schools in many countries, American law schools are committed almost exclusively to train-
ing people for the practice of law. Students enter law school only after having made a decision to
enter the profession. Within a year after they enter the schools, many have begun working in
part-time law jobs; there they get messages directly from their employers about what is needed
for professional success. This guidance, plus the bar exam, shapes student demand for educa-
tion. Further, the law schools are financially dependent on the profession. Few universities pro-
vide real support to their law schools, so that the school's financial base depends on tuition-
which students allocate with a view towards professional career advancement-and donations-
which alumni give to maintain a supply of graduates and the production of forms of symbolic
capital that promote their interests. For a general discussion of legal education, its nature and
constraints, see R. STEVENs, LAW SCHOOL: LEAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850's TO
THE 1980's (1983).
35. See J. HEINz & E. LAUMANN, THE CHJcAoo LAWYERS (1982); M. LARSON, supra note
25, at 175; R. NELSON, PARTNERS wITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORmATION OF THE LARGE
LAW FiRm (1988); Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice and Legal Institutions, 28 Am.
Soc. REv. 52 (1963); Ladinsky, The Social Profile of the Metropolitan Bar: A Statistical Survey
in Detroit, 43 MICH. ST. B.J. 12 (1964).
36. The recent conference on The New Public Interest Law, co-sponsored by the New Col-
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This structural position of the legal academy provides some "room
for maneuver." ' "1 The legal academy can be a base for critical thought,
and the breeding ground for projects which challenge the status quo.
Of course, nothing guarantees that opportunities will be seized, but
something about the motivation to enter law in the first place, and
then to opt for a career in academic law, encourages the legal profes-
soriate to challenge the status quo. Few careers in America hold out
much promise for those who have what Roberto Unger calls "the
transformative vocation."3 s And while law often disappoints those
who enter it with such aspirations, faute de mieux they continue to
turn to the law. As a result, academic legal studies have attracted
small cadres of people who champion social justice, seek reform, and
embrace a critical vision of American society. And the law schools
have not completely deprived such folks of opportunities for transfor-
mative thought and action.
B. Movements in Legal Thought: From Legal Realism to Imperial
Law
These aspects of the legal academy are visible in the history of the
movements in legal thought that led to, and supported, the initial de-
velopment of the law and society idea. In this section, I will emphasize
two critical movements in legal thought that preceded law and society:
Legal Realism, and a form of post-Realist legal consciousness I call
"Imperial Law." Law and society may have been the offspring of Le-
gal Realism, but it was born in the age of Imperial Law.
lege and the Conference for Critical Legal Studies and held in San Francisco on January 7-8,
1990, is an example of such an alliance. Law professors and law students joined community
activists and public interest lawyers to discuss new strategies for legal activism in practice and
education in the 1990's.
Bourdieu recognizes the force of counter-hegemonic groups within the field. Although his
own study of the juridical field has exposed a "division of juridical labor" which characterizes
the stratification of the legal profession, The Force of Law, supra note 21, at 808, Bourdieu also
recognizes that dominated groups always exert a certain force within a social field. "mo belong
to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it (if only to elicit
reactions of exclusion on the part of those who occupy the dominant positions), thus of putting
certain forces into motion." Reflexive Sociology, supra note 21, at 36.
37. I borrow this phrase from Rosemary Coombe's article, Room for Maneuver: Toward a
Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 69, 121 (1989). Coombe
analyzes the development of practice theory in law, anthropology, and social theory. Practice
theory resurrects human agency in the critical analysis of structures. Coombe rejects the struc-
ture-subjectivity polarity, asserting that structure can be at once constraining and enabling, con-
stitutive but not determining. Id. at 71, 90-92. For further application of the method of
"transcending structuralism," see infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
38. R. UNom, SocIAL THzoRY: ITs SrrUATION AND TAsKs 11-12, 26-35 (1987).
1990]
18 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
1. Legal Realism
It is pretty well accepted that Legal Realism set the stage for the
development of the law and society movement. But what was Legal
Realism, and what legacy did it leave to its progeny? This story has
been told elsewhere at great length; here I merely want to summarize
an account developed by numerous scholars. 9
(a) The Classical Tradition
The first thing to look at is classical legal thought, the tradition
against which the Realists wrote. The classical tradition had served as
a legitimating ideology for the legal elite in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, and contained a powerful account of legal
neutrality. A main feature of Realism was the effort to complete the
critique of classical legal thought initiated by Holmes and Pound. Re-
alism was as much a rejection of an earlier tradition as it was a full-
blown theory of law.
Classical legal thought was objectivist in both senses of the term. It
pictured the legal order as the embodiment of ordered liberty. It also
described legal thought and scholarship as a neutral science capable of
deducing fundamental and non-problematic principles from authorita-
tive sources and applying them dispassionately to the resolution of so-
cial conflict. The Realists rejected this classical account of legal
reasoning and scholarship as arid formalism, and unmasked its ideo-
logical commitment to an extreme form of individualism and laissez
faire.
The collapse of nineteenth century legal science under the onslaught
of Realist analysis was exhilarating. But it also was threatening, even
to those who participated gleefully in the process of "deconstruc-
tion. '" 40 Attacked for undermining the foundations of the law, and
39. I have based the discussion in this section on the following sources: L. KALmAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986); Boyle, The Politics of Reason, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685
(1985); Gordon, supra note 21; Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE
PoLImcs oF LAW 18 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Peller, supra note 32; Singer, supra note 31.
40. Legal Realist thought embodied two contradictory strands, one critical (deconstructive)
and one scientistic (constructive). Kalman identifies these as positive and negative aspects of the
"functionist" approach. L. KALmAN, supra note 39, at 3.
Realists challenged the legitimacy of formalist doctrine by exposing the contingency of judi-
cial decision-making, the indeterminacy of rules, and the circularity of legal reasoning itself. The
implications of their criticisms were profound. Faced with the fundamental indeterminacy of
law, the apparent impossibility of objective legal reasoning, and the (probable) awareness that
such ideas could undermine the power and prestige of the legal academy, the profession, and its
institutions, many Realists retreated into the safe harbor of legal objectivity. Rather than focus
on the contingent and inherently political nature of legal representations of the social world,
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thus its authority, the Realists sought a new grounding for legal deci-
sion-making and scholarship.
(b) Social Science
One of the answers Realists found for the "legitimation crisis" they
had engendered was social science. There was an intimate relationship
between the very name of this jurisprudential school-Realism-and
the belief in social science. Realists thought social science was the key
to reality. They believed that social science methods would open the
path to three kinds of fundamental knowledge: Knowledge of the real
reasons underlying judicial decisions, knowledge of the real social is-
sues with which the law must deal, and knowledge of the real con-
straints and possibilities which would dictate neutral solutions to these
issues .4
Thus, Realism was Janus-faced-at the same time a critical practice
and a legitimating ideology. Critical Realism can be seen as one of the
causes of the collapse of older ideas of legal science, and constructive
or scientistic Realism as the source of new ones. While the Realists
critiqued American society and denounced much in American law,
they also constructed the elements of a new, legitimating orthodoxy.
This orthodoxy was based on the redefinition of "science" in the old
term "legal science." In this new vision, law would become a social
science. It would have the power and objectivity of social science as
then understood.
This reconceptualization does not mean, however, that the Realists
ever did much social science or that their commitment to social science
was deep and abiding. The story of the Realists' relationship with so-
cial science is a mixed one, at best. Some got lost in the pursuit of
empirical minutia, while others lost confidence that social science
would produce the results busy legal reformers needed. 42 Indeed, one
observer has concluded that the real heritage of Legal Realism was to
Realists sought to stabilize the uncertainty they had exposed with a new source for legal repre-
sentations-an empirically knowable "reality." Thus, the Realists urged a new form of legal
science which would account for "facts," "consequences," and "actual conditions" and pro-
vide the rationality, predictability, and objectivity that formalism lacked. See R. STEVENS, supra
note 34; Boyle, supra note 39; Peller, supra note 32; Schlegel, American Legal Realism and
Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BurnAJO L. REv. 459, 460 (1979);
White, supra note 12, at 821-24.
41. See, e.g, Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 815, 833, 842-47 (1935); Llewelyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HLRv. L. REv. 1222,
1244-46, 1250 (1931). See generally L. KLmAN, supra note 39; Schlegel, supra note 40.
42. Schlegel, supra note 40, at 569-86; White, supra note 12, at 824.
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legitimate a kind of ad hoc, particularistic policy discourse that was
actually hostile to systematic social science. 43
I don't think the Realists ever fully grasped what later emerged as
the "law and society idea." Certainly, they encouraged an alliance be-
tween law and the social sciences, but they were lawyers first and fore-
most. The Realists were more interested in using social science than in
redefining law as an object social scientists could study.
(c) Legitimation of the Activist State
Realism did, however, bring about a change in legal discourse: It
demolished the classical tradition, which rested on a faith in abstract
principles, conceptual structures, deductive reasoning, and limited
government. Freed from these conceptual limitations, Realist-trained
lawyers were able to participate in the construction and defense of the
affirmative state ushered in by the New Deal. In the age of the activist
state, this change made it possible for lawyers to continue to represent
themselves as neutral actors in society.
The lawyers who shaped the affirmative state and redefined the old
idea of law as a mediating force had to reconstruct the idea of legal
neutrality. In the nineteenth century, objectivism had first been linked
to the elite lawyers' superior ability to grasp the principles of civic
virtue, and later to the deductive methods of classical conceptual ju-
risprudence." The activist state ushered in during the 1930's de-
manded a new account of objectivism consistent with both the
commitment to affirmative intervention in economic and social life,
and the modernist culture of the twentieth century: neither civic virtue
nor classical formalism would serve this purpose.
The Realists found one answer in the idea of objective knowledge
of society, and thus in social science. The idea that law could be
grounded on objective social knowledge provided by the social sci-
ences, therefore, became essential to the Realists' rhetoric, even if the
production of such knowledge was not an essential part of their prac-
tice. In this fashion, Realism put social science on the agenda of the
American legal academy.
2. Imperial Law
While Realism opened the closed world of law to the social sciences,
the "law and society idea" did not take shape until after Realism had
43. B. AcKERmAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMEIcAN LAW 5 (1984).
44. Gordon, supra note 21, at 98; Gordon, supra note 22, at 11-30; Grey, Langdell's Ortho-
doxy, 45 U. PT. L. REv. 1, 32, 35-38 (1983).
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waned. Only in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the real work of
reconceptualizing law as an object for social scientific study carried
out, and key law and society institutions founded. 45 This was the age
of Imperial Law.
(a) Law as an Instrument of Social Change
Why call this post-Realist era in legal thought "Imperial"? I use
this term because in this period, many in the legal elite believed the
law could and should be actively used to shape society. This activist
legal consciousness formed the context in which law and society took
shape.
The post-war period was a time in which lawyers thought they could
devise relatively unproblematic systems of social governance and
transformation. The legal culture of the time encouraged them to be-
lieve in law as a powerful instrument to change society and-at the
same time-as a repository of standards and principles for the gover-
nance of social life. They felt that they knew or could easily learn how
society should be organized. If something was wrong somewhere in
the world, the jurists of the Imperial Age of American law were ready
to fix it.
Imperial legal scholars saw the law as the embodiment of reason
and thought that through the law more rational forms of social life
could be created. Law was "univocal": behind the welter of compet-
ing precedents and rules, scholars could discern fundamental princi-
ples which would provide normative guidance. Law was also
powerful: it was separate from the sources of inequality and domina-
tion which hampered the realization of liberal ideals in society and
was available for the egalitarian transformation of such systems.
Whether they were concerned with using law to eradicate poverty, end
racial discrimination, or modernize "underdeveloped" countries, Im-
45. The Law and Society Association, which traces its beginnings to an August 1964 meet-
ing of the American Sociological Association, was formally incorporated on November 17, 1964.
In 1965, the Russell Sage Foundation committed funds for The Law and Society Review, which
appeared in its current format and design in 1966. See comments of then LSA President, Robert
B. Yegge, in I LAW & Soc'Y REV. 3-4 (1966).
During the 1960's, the Russell Sage Foundation facilitated the incorporation of the social
sciences into the law curriculum with grants to the law schools at Berkeley, Northwestern, Wis-
consin, and Yale. R. STEVENS, supra note 34, at 226 n.68. The Walter E. Meyer Institute, the
American Bar Foundation, and the National Science Foundation (where the Law and Social
Sciences Program was established in 1971) also provided funding for work in law and social
sciences. Id. at 286 n.62.
1990]
22 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
perial jurists seemed confident in their mission and sure of their
power.46
(b) Continuation of the Idea of Legal Neutrality
In the sense described above, Imperial law continued the tradition
of law as a mediating force and the idea of the legal profession as a
separate estate charged with guarding a higher normative vision. Im-
perial legal scholars picked up this idea where the Legal Realists had
left it. They shared the Realists' faith in the activist state. They took
seriously the Realists' view that objective science was necessary for
full realization of the activist ideal. And they fostered a series of those
alliances with the social sciences for which Realists had merely
called-or with which they had toyed. From the point of view of the
Imperial jurists, social science knowledge was necessary so they could
better understand the law's operation and implement its objectives.
(c) Contradictions in Imperial Legal Culture
While my metaphor of an Imperial Law makes it sound strong and
self-confident, I suspect that the truth is more complex. I think that if
we were to look more closely at the legal thought of the early 1960's,
we would be able to see two contradictory ideas in play. The first was
the idea of the higher morality of law: the notion that contained in the
legal tradition itself were standards and criteria for the evaluation and
transformation of society. This idea drew heavily on the higher law
tradition of American constitutionalism, although it was not restricted
to constitutional doctrines. It was a sort of secular natural law, based
on a view that the formative acts of the Republic and the workings of
the common law process had in some mystical way generated a self-
contained set of norms and more general principles which could be
deployed by jurists to define proper conduct in all spheres of social
life .47
Juxtaposed to this idea, which saw law as a plenitude or a self-con-
tained system of normative guidance, were doubts about law's inter-
nal coherence and sufficiency which had been created by the Legal
Realists' critique of classical legal doctrine. My Imperial jurists, were,
after all, the heirs of Realism. And if, as the Realists had argued, legal
46. For an assessment of the goals of law and development studies and a discussion of the
liberal legal paradigm, see Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 Wis. L. REv.
1062, 1078-80 (1974).
47. Roberto Unger calls this idea one of a "legal order." R. UNOER, LAW iN MODERN
SocmET 52-54 (1976). See also Where the Action Is, supra note 2, at 577-79 (discussing the
critique of the idea of legal order).
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doctrine was contradictory and indeterminate-containing not one but
several possible normative visions-how could the higher law ideal
make any sense? If lawyers wanted to shape new social arrangements
in the name of law, how could they ground their new visions if they
could not derive a coherent set of principles from law itself?
A Legal Imperialist Faces the Younger Generation
Shortly after I left the Yale Law School in 1961, I took a job with
the Agency for International Development (AID), working as a
lawyer in the "Alliance for Progress." This was the heyday of
America's liberal empire. AID was charged with assisting the
"development" of the Third World: quite unself-consciously we
imagined that this meant making Third World nations more like the
United States. We were charged with the exciting mission of
exporting democratic capitalism, American technology, and efficient
government to countries which were too poor or benighted to grasp
the possibilities of this superior form of civilization. As lawyers, our
job was to expedite the operation of America's civilizing mission. We
were hard-headed pragmatists, dedicated to getting things done in a
cumbersome bureaucratic maze. We helped arrange the financing
and construction of dams and steel mills, and created legal structures
for transmissions of American know-how. With our help, experts
from America's universities came to Latin America to teach
Brazilians, Colombians, and Bolivians how to produce better eggs
and more butter. Many AID lawyers of that day thought of ourselves
as an elite: we were smarter than the development experts whose
work we facilitated, more pragmatic than the foreign officials and
lawyers with whom we worked, and more committed to liberal values
than the governments we were assisting.
Looking at the vast range of programs that AID produced to
promote "development, " we felt something was missing: no one was
actively "developing" the rule of law. This omission seemed to be
serious, but was easily remedied. We devised grand programs to re-
educate Third World lawyers, who-we felt-had failed to
understand the mix of pragmatic instrumentalism and liberal
idealism that had been the staple of our legal education. By
exporting the educational techniques of the American law school-
socratic method, social science, and all-we would strengthen legal
institutions just as AID agricultural technicians were transforming
small, yellow eggs into large, white ones. We struggled nobly, but
our efforts were disappointing. Some Third World lawyers took our
money but rejected our lessons. Others accepted the message that law
should become more instrumental, but saw no reason why it should
also be liberal: they became willing technocratic servants of despotic
regimes. Finally, someone wrote up the history nf these failed
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efforts: he called the book Legal Imperialism." It recounted our
overbearing efforts to export American legal culture and reported
our frustrations when idealistic plans went awry.
In the early 1980's, my daughter, who was studying the history of
United States intervention in Latin America, read the book. Asked
what she thought of my exploits, she said: "Daddy, you were a
schmuck."
III. THE CREATION OF THE LAW AND SOCIETY IDEA
This part of the Article deals with the formation of the law and
society idea. In it, I use an "ideal-typical" analysis to model some of
the varied perspectives and motives of those who joined together in
the movement. Then I sketch a vision of law and its study which
emerged from this interaction: this version was the first law and soci-
ety idea to appear, and I dub it "the original understanding." Finally,
I speculate on what caused the movement initially to define the law
and society domain as it did.
A. Varied Perspectives
I have spoken of the "law and society movement" as if it were a
unified group of people sharing common views and goals. This arti-
fact of the narrative is misleading, for there have always been many
different currents of thought about law, society, and social science in
the movement. The people who worked to create the law and society
idea came from very different starting points and had very different
goals for the enterprise.
Without a full-scale social and intellectual history, one can only
speculate on the various strands that made up the "movement" I have
been describing. To give some sense of the diversity, and to explain
how very different groups found some common ground, I have con-
structed five imaginary "ideal-typical" actors whose perspectives
stand for separate parts of the curious alliance that is the law and
society movement. On the social science side there are three "actors":
I call these the True Scientist, the Social Problem Solver, and the
Technician. On the law side, there are two: The Imperial Jurist and
the Skeptical Pragmatist. 49
48. J. GARDm, LEOAL IMPERIALISM (1980).
49. The "ideal-typical actors" in this section are heuristic models, not real people. The law
and society movement contains people with very different epistemologies, politics, professional
roles and loyalties, disciplinary affiliations, and career aspirations. Moreover, the preceeding
characteristics all may chrc'e over time. Combining all these variables would generate a plethora
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I have used male pronouns in this section for simplicity and histori-
cal accuracy. While Laura Nader was active in the very early days of
the law and society movement, the pioneers were predominantly male.
1. The True Scientist
The True Scientist believes that society obeys natural laws. He
searches for the underlying forces that govern the behavior of groups
and individuals. He sees the natural sciences as the model for social
science. He believes that "theory" is a statement of empirically ob-
served regularities. Whether he favors "grand" or "middle-range"
theory, the True Scientist aspires to produce a body of certifiable
knowledge which will hold true for all time and all places. To be certi-
fiable as scientific, this knowledge must be supported by empirical evi-
dence which meets the evidentiary standards of the social science
community.
The True Scientist wants to study law because it is an important
domain of society-like the family, religion, or the military. He wants
to study all domains of social existence that laypersons and lawyers
think of as "the law." But the Scientist may not be primarily inter-
ested in "the law" or "legal studies" as such, and will redefine "le-
gal" phenomena in terms drawn from social science theory. Thus for
the Scientist, behaviors drawn from the world of law are seen as ex-
amples of the dperation of categories like "rule-oriented behavior,"
"social control," "strategic bargaining," and so on.
People who had these perspectives and motives in the 1950's and
1960's could see law and the legal system as an attractive domain for
social inquiry. Law was clearly important in our society, yet it was
of theoretically possible "positions" on law, social knowledge, and politics. The models in this
section simplify this complexity by putting together five typical "clusters" which then generate
typical "motivations." I then use this model to explain why diverse "actors" might have reached
tacit agreement on the original definition of the law and society "idea" for a new domain of
knowledge. I have drawn these models from my own observations over twenty-five years of
work as a law and society scholar, and also base them on the critical work I did in several
previous articles. See supra note 2 and the sources cited therein.
The use of ideal types, which abstract from actual historical events and generate heuristic
models that can be used for analysis and as tools for detailed histories and biographies, is com-
mon in the social sciences. See generally T. BtURGER, MAX WEBER'S THEORY OF CONCEPT FoRAu-
TION: HISTORY, LAWS, AND IDEAL TYPES (1976). Since few concrete individual law and society
scholars ever fit exactly into any one of these "types" (and if they did, they rarely stayed there
throughout a career), it would be unfair and misleading to cite specific authors and works as
illustrations of each type. For some illustrative material on different visions of law and society,
see Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81 YALE L.J. 1086 (1972); Friedman, The Law
and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. Rv. 763 (1986); Galanter, supra note 5; Selznick, The
Sociology ofLaw, in SocIOLOGY TODAY 115 (1959); Whitford, Lowered Horizons: Implementa-
tion Research in a Post-CLS World, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 755 (1986).
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virtually unexplored territory for social researchers. Law schools dom-
inated legal studies, but had shown little interest in social science. And
when aroused, the schools' interest, if it went beyond rhetoric, was
primarily instrumental. For the True Scientists, the discovery of law
as a domain for 'social inquiry had the same appeal as the unearthing
of an unknown ancient civilization would have for archaeologists.
2. The Social Problem Solver
Some social scientists who participated in the early years of the law
and society movement were attracted by the use of social science to
"solve" social problems. They felt that phenomena like crime, ra-
cism, poverty, and "underdevelopment" were "problems" susceptible
to rational analysis and solution. Social science, for example, would
"prove" that racial discrimination was irrational and would help cre-
ate programs that would lead to its elimination. Social Problem Sol-
vers were Scientists-they believed in the goal of certifiable
knowledge-but they were Scientists with a social mission. They were
attracted to the law because an alliance with it would give them access
to centers of power and opportunities to participate in social reform
programs.
3. The Technician
Most social scientists sought a body of certifiable knowledge worth
developing for its own sake: Some also sought an opportunity to put
this knowledge to work for reform effects in which they believed. But
at least a few among the social science pioneers saw themselves pri-
marily as technicians with skills that an expanded field of legal studies
would need. As social science discovered the new domain of behavior
in law, and law began to seek more reliable knowledge of social condi-
tions, opinions, and trends, a new set of technical skills was needed.
Survey researchers, statisticians, and other experts could find employ-
ment in the new domain being created by law and society: These were
the Technicians.
4. The Imperial Jurist
Post-Realist Imperial Jurists were attracted to social science. Some
thought social science might supplement legal doctrine, providing an
answer to the normative crisis created by Realism's deconstruction of
classical legal thought. If legal doctrines were indeterminate, or even
contradictory, perhaps social science would serve as a useful supple-
ment for legal thought, providing maps that legal reformers could fol-
low in their efforts to reshape society through law. Social science
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would tell us what was natural and necessary in social life. A jurist of
this persuasion would be attracted to the vision of the law and society
project promoted by the True Scientists.
While some Imperial Jurists may have believed that social science
could reveal a natural order and provide a new foundation for law,
most probably thought of the alliance with social science in more in-
strumental terms. In this approach, law needed social science more as
a scout than as a guru. Social science would not tell law what to do,
but would instead help it understand its powers and limits, and pro-
vide information on the effects of its interventions. 0
5. The Skeptical Pragmatist
Imperial Jurists sought certainty and instrumental power through
social science. They shared the motivations of the Scientists and the
Social Problem Solvers, and employed willing Technicians. But some
of the lawyers who forged this alliance with social science had more
modest goals. The Skeptical Pragmatists, like the Imperial Jurists,
were thoroughly post-Realist. They were skeptical about legal doc-
trine, which they recognized as contradictory and indeterminate, but
had no grand illusions about social science. They saw it as a useful
way of understanding the legal process. They embraced social science
without believing it would provide a new foundation for legal studies,
resolve legitimation problems, or better arm lawyers to transform the
world. Empirical knowledge was simply considered more useful than
doctrinal learning."s
B. The Law and Society Idea
Given these diverse perspectives and motives, it seems amazing that
the law and society movement could ever agree on anything. Yet it
did, at least enough to hold together for twenty-five years, produce a
substantial body of scholarship, and even influence legal education
and policy. One explanation is that everyone-albeit for different rea-
sons-had a stake in the new domain of knowledge that was being
50. For some in the Imperial Age, the merger of law and social science was a marriage of
convenience. Some lawyers looked to social science for a certainty they knew no longer could be
found in legal doctrine, while some social scientists sought in the law access which, they felt, was
denied them in their own right. For these people, the alliance was a way to get something they
couldn't secure on their own. Like royal mistresses in earlier times, social scientists may have
thought that by an alliance with law they could exercise power behind the scenes. Like nineteenth
century parvenus who married into aristocratic families, lawyers may have imagined that an
alliance with the social sciences would give them intellectual certainty and cultural legitimacy.
51. For a more detailed description of this approach, see Where the Action Is, supra note 2,
at 618-19.
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constructed. And all were willing to give assent, if only tacitly, to a set
of general notions about the enterprise.
1. The Domain
Everyone agreed that law could and should be studied as a social
phenomenon. They saw that law could be thought of in the terms and
vocabularies used by the social sciences. Judicial decisions could be
analyzed as strategic action to realize political goals, rather than as
exercises in deductive logic. Trials could be seen not as exercises in
forensic skill or dispassionate searches for objective truth, but as ex-
amples of small-group dynamics. Litigation could be studied as a
form of social conflict, using insights from games theory and cogni-
tive psychology. Implementation could be thought of not as a prob-
lem of fostering obedience to orders, but rather as negotiation among
groups with different resources and powers and conflicting goals.
2. The Original Understanding
Out of this shared commitment to the creation of a new domain of
knowledge came an understanding that had wide currency in the early
years. The original understanding represents the first incarnation of
the law and society idea. It had five elements:
(a) Systemicity: Society is a system. It contains interacting
elements made up of the behaviors of individuals and groups. These
behaviors obey regular laws. "Law" is both a separate system in
itself and part of a larger social system or set of systems.
(b) Objectivism: Objective knowledge of the "laws" governing the
operation of the legal system, its component parts, and its
relationship with other systems can be produced through application
of methods common to all sciences, natural and social.
(c) Disengagement: To develop this objective knowledge, a new set
of scholarly institutions, disengaged from the production of legal
doctrine, the education of legal professionals, and the goals of any
group or faction in society, is desirable.
(d) Univocality: The law itself, including higher law sources like
the Constitution, contains a univocal set of normative standards
available for social criticism and reconstruction.
(e) Progressivism: The combined insights of an objective body of
social knowledge and the "higher" law immanent within legal
doctrine would provide support and guidance for the liberal reform
projects of the time, particularly the full implementation of the
Warren Court reforms, Civil Rights legislation, and Great Society
programs.
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This "original understanding" formed a set of tacit agreements and
background conventions that helped the movement cohere. It served
as a way of explaining and legitimating the law and society idea in its
earliest phases. It influenced the research programs that were devel-
oped in the early period and the institutions created to embody the
alliance and carry out those programs.
While it is important to appreciate this understanding and the role it
played, we must be equally clear on what it is not. The original under-
standing does not describe the views of all the people who made up
the movement. Nor is it a condensation of the assumptions underlying
the best work done by law and society scholars in the early years.
With hindsight, we can see that the more lasting products of the
movement-like Stewart Macaulay's Non-Contractual Relations in
Business 2 and Marc Galanter's classic Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead53-rejected one or more of these assumptions. It would be a
mistake to confuse what I have called the "original understanding"
with the "law and society idea" as we understand it today.
C. Motives-The Shadow of Law and Policy
Why did the movement accept, at least tacitly, the assumptions con-
tained in the original understanding? There were, I suspect, a very
complex set of motivations. Remember that the founders had to legiti-
mate a new enterprise. They had to secure resources needed to build a
discipline that had no formal home in the academy or elsewhere. They
had to get law schools to embrace a new way of thinking about law
which posed a challenge to the traditional knowledges the schools had
fostered for over a century. They had to get social science depart-
ments to accept a subject of scholarship they had long ceded to the
law schools. They had to find resources for research projects which no
university was equipped to support.
The founders had to convince law schools either to support the new
science or at least to tolerate its existence elsewhere in the university.
Since there was no agency ready to provide adequate financial support
for an autonomous "discipline" of law and society, their product was
often tailored to meet the needs of government agencies and founda-
tions which had policy goals that might be served by law and society
knowledge.14 Because this tactical maneuvering shaped the movement
52. 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
53. 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
54. No one should underestimate the importance of funding agencies and their policy goals
in the creation of the law and society movement. The Russell Sage Foundation played a central
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in its early years, we might say that it was formed in the shadow of
law and policy.
The original understanding makes sense if seen in this context. Ob-
jectivism and progressivism appeal to both law schools and policy-
makers. At the same time, disengagement and systemicity appeal to
the universities and the parent disciplines of the social science partici-
pants in the movement. Univocality gave the social scientists a stand-
point from which they could measure legal "impact," while assuring
the lawyers that law was the central phenomenon in this new domain
of inquiry.
These "institutional" motives were strengthened by the interests of
specific actors who joined the movement. The interests of True Scien-
tists and Technicians in redefining and reorienting the study of law
along these lines should be obvious. But Social Problem Solvers, Im-
perial Jurists, and Skeptical Pragmatists shared this vision as well. All
saw that objective knowledge about how social life is organized and
how social institutions work would further their somewhat different
projects. The claim that law and society knowledge was objective le-
gitimated the policy solutions of Problem Solvers and Jurists. It also
gave Skeptical Pragmatists a weapon in their struggle against the doc-
trinal tradition in the law schools and a grounding for their efforts to
reform legal education.
A lawyer decides legal education is the enemy of law and society and
is rewarded for his pains
From 1966-73 I taught at Yale Law School. I worked with many law
and society stalwarts to create a true center of interdisciplinary
research on law as a social phenomenon. I reached the conclusion
that the "law and society idea" and legal education as then practiced
were incompatible enterprises. I began to preach the need for a truly
independent center or department of legal studies that could pursue
this idea. The Dean of Yale Law School, known as a champion of
role by supporting the Association, several university centers, fellowships for advanced training,
and specific studies. See supra note 45. But other foundations, and government agencies later,
were also important. Much of the support was motivated by policy concerns, not disciplinary
ideals. Without these "soft-money" sources, there simply would not have been a law and society
movement. See Trubek, A Strategy for Legal Studies: Getting Bok to Work, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
586, 591 (1983). Needless to say, this basic fact shaped research programs and self-descriptions
of the enterprise. Dezalay, Sarat, and Silbey have argued that foundation support helps explain
why law and society scholarship has tended to focus on short-term policy goals and to tacitly
accept as legitimate the basic institutions of American society. Dezalay, supra note 8. See also
Sarat & Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAw & POL'Y 97 (1988) [hereinafter Policy
Audience].
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social science in law, rejected the idea out-of-hand. When Yale did
not give me-or any of my generation of assistant professors-
tenure, I took this idea "on the road" as I searched for a job. Few
of the people at the schools I visited understood or sympathized with
my analysis of the tension between legal education and a social
science of law: Some actively opposed it. I was amazed to learn that
the most passionate opponents were social scientists working in and
around some of the law schools where I sought jobs. They had spent
years trying to convince the law schools that social science was both
necessary and desirable for legal education. They saw me not as an
ally but an enemy.
IV. CRITIQUES OF THE ORIGINAL LAW AND SOCIETY UNDERSTANDING
The original law and society understanding was flawed at its incep-
tion, for it rested on contradictory premises about the nature of both
law and social science. These contradictions were not fully apparent at
the time, but have become clearer in recent years. As a result, some
scholars in the law and society tradition have begun to distance them-
selves from the original understanding and to construct elements of an
alternative vision of the socio-legal enterprise. Many still hold on to
the original faith, but its heyday has passed.
In this part of the Article, I shall outline some of the main critiques
of the original understanding and sketch the alternative visions of law,
society, and social knowledge they imply. While these alternative vi-
sions are still inchoate, they offer new directions as the movement
looks ahead.
A. Society as a System
The law and society movement is largely responsible for bringing
the idea of "society as a system" into modern American legal
thought. The notion that society must be seen as an interdependent set
of elements, with law as one of these elements, represented a major
advance in legal thought." The original understanding of systematic-
ity, though, has been criticized and revised.
55. LAW AND THE Ba-HAvIoRAL SCIENCES is organized around this systems idea. L. FRIED-
MAN & S. MACAULAY, supra note 17. The "interchanges" of the legal system and other social
systems are presented through material discussing the impact of law on society, the impact of
society on law, and the legal system as a social system itself. See also L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE (1975).
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This understanding was formed at a time when the social sciences in
America were under the influence of structural-functionalism.16 This
school's view of the social system contained two key ideas that have
been questioned: social integration and functional necessity. For the
structural-functionalists, society is a tightly integrated system of inter-
related elements or structures. These structures exist because they per-
form functions: One can explain various structures, including those of
ideas, by discovering their function. To this extent, functional analysis
is a useful and unavoidable form of social thought.
But under the sway of objectivist notions, scholars suggested that
observed functions may also be objectively necessary. The 1950's and
1960's necessitarian strain in systems thinking allowed this body of
thought to be easily transformed from a set of analytic statements into
justifications for existing institutional arrangements in American soci-
ety.
Critics, however, have brought both pillars of the analytic structure
into question. Scholars have challenged this notion of a tight societal
integration, asserting that various aspects of society are tied together
in a looser and more tenuous way.5 7 The critics have further ques-
tioned the functional necessity of existing structures. They have re-
placed functional analysis with geneological investigations which show
that social structures and legal institutions are shaped by purpose and
interest, not by the invisible hand of objective necessity." These inves-
tigations do not give up on the effort to situate legal doctrines, ideas,
and institutions within a broader framework of social explanation.
Nor do they abandon functionalism completely. Rather, they relax ne-
cessitarian assumptions and thus allow analysts to question the objec-
tive necessity of particular arrangements which have developed in any
given society. 9
56. See generally TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION (T. Parsons & E. Shils eds. 1951);
A. GOULDNER, THE CocM[o CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (1970) (containing an overview of
Talcott Parson's ideology); C. MULLINs, THEORIES AND THEORY GRoUP's IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 66-67 (1973) (stating that structural functionalism was the majority view in
sociology from 1951-68); Introduction to NEOFuNCTIONAUSM (J. Alexander ed. 1985) (tracing the
growth and "vulgarization" of Parsonianism from the 1940's to the 1970's).
57. For an analysis of emerging scholarship that rejects a determinist understanding of so-
cial structures and advances "practice theory," see Coombe, supra note 37.
58. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 70-71 (1984).
59. Roberto Unger has written a sweeping and comprehensive critique of objectivist/neces-
sitarian modes of social analysis. See R. UNGER, SoCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK
(1987) [hereinafter SociAL THEORY]. Unger has also given us examples of "post-systems" analy-
sis in law. This illustration is clearly seen in his appraisal of the history of contract and property
rights in the West. Where conventional systems accounts start with the idea of the market as a
system and explain the history of property and contract as responses to the functional impera-
tives of a market, Unger sees the particular regimes which emerged as politically determined
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A good example of legal post-functionalist systems thinking can be
seen in recent feminist critiques of law. These analyses use structural
explanations of male domination as both analytical and critical tools.
Feminists have highlighted ways in which bodies of legal doctrine and
systems of legal thought constitute and maintain patriarchal relation-
ships where women are subordinated to (and defined by) men. This
account includes a notion of structure (or system): patriarchy or male
domination is conceived of as a patterned structure made up of inter-
related elements. This idea of "structure" or system is loosened and
relativized, especially in the work of recent, explicitly post-structural-
ist feminist critics.60 Post-structuralist feminists recognize structure
while denying that it reflects objective necessity or manifests norma-
tive validity.6 1
Contemporary feminists and other critical thinkers may still speak
of social "structure" and "system," just as law and society scholars
did in the early days. Such terms as they are used today, though, do
not refer to something determined by objective laws, validated by
functional necessity, or unalterable.6 2 Instead of using the term "sys-
tem" in the way astronomers might, today's critical thinkers have
more in mind its usage in the phrase "it's hard to beat the system."
They don't think of themselves as detached scientists charting the
"system," but rather as street-smart actors looking for ways to beat
it.
B. Objectivism: The Idea of a Positive Social Science
The original understanding of systematicity was connected to an ob-
jectivist epistemology. Society was perceived as an object, like the so-
compromises among competing groups and interests. The institutions which functionalists as-
cribe to historically recognized objective necessities appear, in this account, as contradiction-
laden structures which mature as they ratify particular constellations of power and interest. See
R. UNOER, FAlSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL
DEMOCRACY 195-207 (1987).
60. Teresa de Lauretis and Joan W. Scott have written persuasively on the need for feminist
scholarship to go beyond the limits of structuralism. See, e.g.,FEMINIST STUDIEs/CrMcAL STUD-
ms (T. de Lauretis ed. 1986); Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33 (1988). For application of this
approach to law, see Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations
of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
103 HARv. L. REv. 1749 (1990). See also Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal
Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989).
61. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATF (1989); Scales,
The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); West, Jurispru-
dence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
62. For a discussion of the ideas and critiques of structural and post-structural feminism,
see Schultz, Room to Maneuver (f)or a Room of One's Own? Practice Theory and Feminist
Practice, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 123, 127-134 (1989). Cf. Coombe, supra note 37, at 90, 111
(asserting that structures and systems have independent existences only inasmuch as they are
analytic tools which render certain actions intelligible).
1990]
34 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
lar system, with invariant relationships and determinate regularities.
In this context, social science could be imagined as a neutral technique
to grasp the regularities that govern the operations of this object.
Thus, the original law and society understanding employed a concept
of science and scientific method that was modeled on prevailing views
of how natural science worked.
It is no surprise that law and society initially accepted a positivist
notion of social science. 63 This view of social knowledge was wide-
spread in the social sciences in the 1950's and 1960's. Moreover, it was
attractive to the legal academic culture. Post-Realist legal thought can
be seen as a series of evasions, efforts to deny the normative crisis
generated by Realism's deconstructive onslaughts. As Joseph Singer
has pointed out, most post-Realist scholars sought some substitute for
the normative authority of the lost doctrinal tradition. 64 Where legal
process theorists offered neutral procedures as the answer, law and
society promised objective knowledge produced by a positive science
of society.
Positive science, like procedure, answers the question of normative
thought by evading it. If society were a system obeying objective laws,
and if positive science could identify those laws and unearth the social
policies that were consistent with them, then policy formation would
once again be grounded on a neutral and objective basis. While the
idea of a positive science of society seems to us one of the most prob-
lematic features of the original understanding, it may have seemed
particularly attractive to the lawyers of the Imperial epoch.
In recent years, many critics have questioned the positivist account
of objectivity in social knowledge. 65 Some have sought to develop an
alternative view, which I shall call "discursivity.'' 66 This view of the
social disciplines starts with the recognition that social knowledge
does not mirror an objective reality that is somehow "out there," but
is instead part of the process through which social relations are
formed and reformed. The understanding of social science as a discur-
63. For a discussion of positivism in law and society, see Trubek & Esser, supra note 2
(discussing the continued hold of this mode of thought on the movement); Max Weber's Tragic
Modernism, supra note 2 (a critique of positivism); Where the Action Is, supra note 2 (discussing
positivism in law and society studies).
64. Singer, supra note 31, at 518-28.
65. For a general discussion of objectivism, see R. UNGER, supra note 38. See also Trubek
& Esser, supra note 2, at 12-13.
66. I take the term "discursivity" from E. LACLAu & C. MoUrn, HEGEMONY AND SOCIAL-
iST STRATEGY 2-5 (1985). For a discussion of discursivity in law and society research, see Hand-
maiden's Revenge, supra note 2, at 133.
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sive practice has begun to influence the social disciplines and to enter
into the thinking of some law and society scholars. 67
To embrace discursivity is to recognize that social life is a network
of relations invested with differentials of power. These relationships
are constituted linguistically (or "discursively"): the very concepts we
use to describe and explain society contribute to the constitution of
social relations. As a result, we cannot separate our studies and under-
standings of social life from social life itself: as social "scientists," we
cannot detach ourselves and our knowledges from society in the way
astronomers separate themselves from the solar system. It follows that
when we construct an account of society, we do not simply mirror
social relations, but rather contribute either to their reproduction or
transformation.
The recognition of discursivity changes our whole understanding of
the relationship between law and the social disciplines. If social
knowledge is discursive, it cannot produce unproblematic maps of so-
cial relations or uncontested, factually-based answers to questions of
social policy. This recognition means that whatever social science can
do for law, it cannot offer the objectivist grounding for legal policy
for which Imperial jurists may have hoped. If legal culture accepts the
critique of objectivism and the concept of discursive social knowledge,
the original understanding will be drawn into question, and the nature
and purpose of the alliance between law and the social disciplines will
have to be reexamined.
C. Disengagement from Law and Politics
The third feature of the original understanding was the idea that
law and society as a scholarly project should be disengaged from both
legal doctrine and politics. At least some of the founders saw a need
to make law and society an autonomous enterprise, disengaged from
both the traditional pursuit of legal knowledge and direct program-
matic involvement. This double disengagement was needed to carry
out the original law and society research program: the application of
the methods of positive science to the study of both society and law as
systems.
Disengagement from law was also needed because studying "law"
at the time meant the examination of doctrine and the interpretation
of rules and texts. Law and society sought to constitute a different
kind of "law" as the object of study-law as system and behavior
would join law as doctrine and idea as legitimate objects for study. To
67. See Trubek & Esser, supra note 2, at 22-23.
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accomplish this task, the movement had to disengage from academic
law as then practiced. Disengagement from politics, at least provision-
ally, was also needed. Having adopted an objectivist concept of social
knowledge, law and society needed to present itself as independent
from and neutral towards any particular group interest or social vi-
sion. It sought knowledge of social laws and regularities which-it
was thought-were independent of values and programs.
For those who accept discursivity, however, disengagement is both
undesirable and ultimately impossible. If social knowledge constitutes
rather than mirrors social relations, its producers have a responsibility
for the social impact of the knowledges they construct. Moreover, in
this view, social knowledge is inherently programmatic: if we are to
understand society, we must imagine how it might be transformed. 61
Thus, it makes no sense to speak of the production of knowledge in-
dependent of projects that either reproduce or transform social life.
There are additional reasons to question disengagement today. The
original rationale for it was both practical and epistemological. As we
come to question its epistemological foundations, so should we inter-
rogate its practical bases. These were founded in a perceived need to
insulate a fledgling enterprise from the older doctrinal tradition in the
law. Perhaps such protectionism was needed in the days when law and
society was an infant industry. But much has changed since 1964. The
law and society movement has taken hold in the academy. And legal
academic culture has changed radically: the doctrinal tradition has
crumbled, and eclectic policy science has become the norm, not the
exception. We are all legal realists today. 69
D. Law as a Univocal Source of Normative Guidance
I have suggested that Imperial lawyers looked to science for norma-
tive guidance. Paradoxically, many law and society scholars viewed
law as an unproblematic source of normative inspiration. Remember
that a staple product of the early law and society movement was the
gap study, a research project that took some understanding of the law
as a normative starting point and then measured its impact or "pene-
tration. "70
68. Roberto Unger has argued that it is impossible to divorce social knowledge from visions
of how society should be organized. From this premise he concludes that "programmatic
thought," or the reimagination of society, is an essential part of the social disciplines. See gener-
ally SociAL THEORY, supra note 59. For a summary of Unger's views, see Trubek, Review Essay:
Radical Theory and Programmatic Thought, 95 Am. J. Soc. 447 (1989).
69. See Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. Rv. 1383 (1980).
70. Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate Persistance
of a Research Tradition, 9 LEGAL STuD. F. 23, 24-30 (1985). See also Friedman, Legal Culture
and Social Development, 4 LAW & Soc'Y lav. 29, 43 (1969).
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This tendency to accept the law as a clear source of legitimate au-
thority can be seen with stark clarity in the work of some "law and
development" scholars. The law and development movement was a
sort of export branch of Imperial legal culture. In the 1960's, Ameri-
can legal academics, encouraged by massive grants from foundations
and government agencies, turned to the study of the role of law in
Third World "development." Some law and society scholars partici-
pated in the law and development effort.7 m
The law and development movement took the value of modern law
to be self evident. "Modern law" usually meant the codes or new stat-
utory enactments which third world governments had imported from
other, presumably more advanced, nations. Usually, these codes or
statutes set forth norms that had little relation to everyday life in the
countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Law and development
scholars assumed that adoption and implementation of these (often
imported) modern laws marked development or progress. 72 And they
treated as a "problem" the fact that social relations in Third World
countries did not conform to these newly enacted norms. This equa-
tion of legal standards with progress, and the definition of non-com-
pliance as a problem, led these scholars to spend a considerable
amount of time thinking about how we could develop a way to meas-
ure-and thus increase-the "penetration" of so-called modern law. 71
Compressed in that single word are a whole set of assumptions and
attitudes that have come under attack. Critics have challenged the fol-
71. The law and development movement was created by legal reformers and legal academ-
ics, but it attracted law and society scholars as well. For a description and critique of the law and
development movement from a law and society perspective, see Trubek & Galanter, supra note
46. The opportunity to develop theories about the role of law in social and economic develop-
ment and to advise governments about the best way to restructure their legal systems attracted
many American legal academics. See J. GARDNER, supra note 48. Some of the pioneers of the
law and society movement wrote on law and development. See, e.g., M. GA.ANTR, THE MOD-
ERNIZATION OF LAW IN MODERNIZATION (1966); Friedman, supra note 70; Trubek, Toward a
Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1 (1972).
Several of the "founders" participated in "law and development" projects: Stewart Macaulay,
for example, spent a year in Chile working with the International Legal Center (ILC), a Ford
Foundation offshoot set up to support "legal development"; Marc Galanter worked in India
and with the ILC; I tried to "modernize" Brazilian legal education and chaired an ILC Commit-
tee on Law and Development Research which included Galanter, Macaulay, and Friedman. Law
and development projects at major United States universities attracted law and society scholars:
Richard Abel, William Felstiner, and I helped run the Yale Law School's Program in Law and
Modernization, funded by the Agency for International Development (AID); Laura Nader, Marc
Galanter, Barbara Yngvesson, and Donald Black all participated in that program; Lawrence
Friedman helped direct a major "law and development" research project, also AID-funded, at
Stanford Law School.
72. Cf. M. GALANTER, supra note 71. For a critical reassessment of the idea of legal devel-
opment, see Trubek & Galanter, supra note 46.
73. Friedman, supra note 70, at 43.
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lowing assumptions: that any body of law contains a single set of
principles or rules whose impact can be unproblematically measured;
that law emanates from some central source and then is implanted in
society; that modern law (whatever that is) is normatively desirable or
historically inevitable; and, finally, that the social scientific task of
measuring "penetration" is a progressive task. It does not require
much sophisticated feminist analysis to see how the use of the term
"penetration" crystalized the hegemonizing, dominating, and patriar-
chal nature of imperial legal culture in the 1960's.
One of the most significant developments in American legal culture
has been the questioning of the whole idea that law contains a univo-
cal set of normative standards, whether of an explicit statutory or
vaguer higher law nature, which can serve as an unproblematic guide-
line for social criticism and transformation. It is important to under-
stand that Imperial Legal scholars from the very beginning must have
understood-at some level-the questionable nature of this notion.
The law and society movement, like all Post-Realist movements in le-
gal thought, was an effort to evade the corrosive effect of Legal Real-,
ism's demolition of ideas of univocality and higher law. But this
recognition was suppressed, and to some degree evaded, when the
original law and society understanding was constructed in the 1960's.
In recent years, substantial bodies of scholarship, including critical
legal studies, feminist critiques of law, and critical race theory, have
brought to light the complex and contradictory nature of legal doc-
trine, thus undermining the idea of univocality. 4 These studies show
that legal doctrine contains alternative normative strands which sug-
gest very different social visions. Moreover, this newer scholarship has
often directly reversed the Imperial Age practice of criticizing society
using legal principles as standards; thus, for example, much of femi-
nist analysis employs normative models of gender equality and differ-
ence to critique legal ideas and institutions which support. and express
patriarchal values and relationships."
74. For an excellent introduction to this form of analysis, see Gordon, Unfreezing Legal
Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 195 (1987). See also R. UNGER, THE
CRmcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988);
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
This mode of analysis was not unknown to the founders of law and society. See Macaulay,
Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, The Law of Con-
tracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1056-69 (1966).
75. Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HAuv. L. REv. 727 (1988); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory:
A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Men-
kel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theo-
ries of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 289 (1989); Minow, Supreme Court,
October 1986 Term-Foreward: Justice Engendered, 101 HAxv. L. REv. 10 (1987).
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E. The Progressive Nature of Law and Society Knowledge
The architects of the law and society movement wanted to create a
field or discipline that was disengaged from politics. Yet they were
confident that this project would contribute to the progressive politi-
cal agenda that they and other academic liberals of the Imperial Age
favored. Of all the contradictions of the original law and society un-
derstanding, this idea that liberal values would be automatically fos-
tered by a neutral science of law in society seems to be the most
perplexing. Yet it was a central, albeit unarticulated, premise of a sig-
nificant portion of the the work produced in the formative period of
the law and society movement.
The Imperial Age was dominated by three major reform impulses
that took hold within the American establishment: (1) the rights ex-
plosion led by the Warren Court; (2) the civil rights efforts of the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations; and (3) the War on Poverty
and other Great Society programs designed to increase economic op-
portunity. A review of the early volumes of the Law and Society Re-
view confirms the extent to which the research conducted and the
results reported were thought to advance the liberal legal agenda of
the day. The contents of these issues can be reduced to two basic cate-
gories: Writings designed to establish law and society as an authorita-
tive discourse grounded in objective methods and the existence of
basic and Universal regularities in society; and writings which used the
newly won authority and voice of law and society scholarship to iden-
tify obstacles, barriers, and resistances to a liberal political agenda
which, although never explicitly thematized or justified, was accepted
as desirable and realizable. 76
76. A systematic review of the first five volumes of the Law and Society Review reveals the
following. Five articles take decisions of the Warren Court as normative standards and seek to
advance the values they appear to enshrine by some form of "gap study"; e.g., Blumberg, The
Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW &
Soc'v REv. 15 (1967). Six articles deal explicitly with Great Society Programs, deploying "scien-
tific" knowledge in ways that are clearly designed to foster or improve activities such as legal
services to the poor, welfare, and urban renewal; e.g., Hannon, The Leadership Problem in the
Legal Services Program, 4 LAW & Soc'y REy. 235 (1969). A third set of studies in these first five
volumes deals with other projects on the liberal agenda of the time, such as reforming the insan-
ity defense and child custody adjudication; e.g., Arens, The Durham Rule in Action: Judicial
Psychiatry and Psychiatric Justice, 1 LAW & Soc'y REv. 41 (1967); Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative
Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort to Rely on Social Science Data in Formulat-
ing Legal Policies, 4 LAW & Soc'y REv. 167 (1969). The remaining articles in these early volumes
can be grouped into three basic categories: (1) methodological essays designed to disseminate
standard sociological methods to law and society scholars, thus ensuring the scientificity of the
work the movement aspired to produce; e.g., Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in the
Legal Impact Study: The Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses, 1 LAW & Soc'y REv. Ill
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Needless to say, events in law and politics have overtaken this naive
equation of neutral, objective science with progressive politics. In the
legal academy a competing academic project-law and economics-
has arisen. This movement, presented as an objective social science,
rests on a more conservative political agenda. Law and economics'
efforts have proven more successful in legal culture than the more hes-
itant efforts of law and society scholars to merge science and progres-
sive politics. In the world of national politics, the liberal coalition has
collapsed and liberal self-confidence has been sapped. We have
learned that many of the bold pronouncements and commitments of
the 1960's were largely symbolic. Many were never implemented, de-
spite the countless gap studies. Law and society scholars began to
learn that it takes more than a study to close the gap between promise
and fulfillment in American life.
Confronting Contradiction: Denouncing the System While Working
Within It
At a recent conference on civil rights, we heard social scientists
describe the worsening condition of blacks and other minorities in
the United States, and legal scholars denounce the courts for
eviscerating many of the statutes and constitutional precedents that
had come out of the civil rights struggles of the 1960's. Some
suggested that racism is structurally necessary for the maintenance of
the status quo in the United States and that the law was being
reshaped to preserve the inner structure of racism while preserving
the appearance of equality for all-no one demurred. Yet even those
who saw racism as structural and the law as available to preserve
racism, argued for continued efforts in the courts and the legislatures
to enhance equality.
Musing on this, I recalled the words of an Asian-American legal
scholar who was a participant in this conference. Mari Matsuda
wrote: "[The]... message ... that legal ideals are manipulable and
that law serves to legitimate existing maldistributions of wealth and
power . . . rings true for anyone who has experienced life in non-
white America. "I But she also said that "ft/he dissonance of
(1966); (2) programmatic essays which seek to establish law and society as a field by discussing
the questions it should address, the concepts it should use, and the objects it should study; e.g.,
Handler, Field Research Strategies in Urban Legal Studies, 5 LAw & Soc'y REv. 345 (1971); and
(3) anthropological studies which use cross-cultural research to support the idea of universal laws
and regularities governing the relationship of "legal" institutions and society; e.g., Count-Van
Manen, A Deviant Case of Deviance: Singapore, 5 LAW & Soc'y REv. 389 (1971); Massell, Law
as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central
Asia, 2 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 179 (1968).
77. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 H~Av.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv 323, 327 (1987).
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combining deep criticism of law with an aspirational vision of law is
part of the experience of people of color. -78 ,
V. POST-ImPERuL LEGAL CULTURE
We now live in a Post-Imperial Age. The main difference between
the legal culture of our day and the epoch in which the law and society
idea took shape and the "original understanding" was formed is not
the disappearance of all the ideas that dominated legal culture in the
Imperial Era, but the fact that they are no longer hegemonic. 79
In this part of the Essay, I shall describe developments in academic
legal culture which could prefigure a change in legal consciousness. As
the power of Imperial legal culture has waned, new ways of thinking
about law have become possible. 0 As a result, we can speak of an
emerging "countervision." This countervision, though, has not led to
a new "understanding," let alone generated a new "paradigm." It is
still more the rejection of prevailing ideas from the Imperial Age than
an alternative conceptualization of law, society, and scholarship.8
Nonetheless, it could be a starting point.
78. Id. at 333.
79. To be sure, there are many voices in the contemporary legal academy who seem to
champion some revised version of the Imperial idea. One can see elements of that vision in B.
AcKE SAN, supra note 43, which calls for a new alliance between law and social science. Traces
of the idea may also be found in the program the new Dean of Harvard Law School has outlined
for that institution. See Carter, At Harvard Law, A New Era Dawns, 11 Nat'l L.J., Aug. 7,
1989, at 1, col. 1.
80. One could see Imperial legal culture as an intellectual project that is beginning to col-
lapse under its own weight. It was really an effort to hold on to an Enlightenment notion of
Reason as a directive force in social life at a time when the foundations of that idea were already
crumbling. Mid-century American jurists engaged in several efforts to reconstitute the idea of
law as objective Reason in the face of critical onslaughts. See Boyle, supra note 39; Peller, supra
note 32; Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988); Singer, supra
note 31. In the original law and society understanding we can see the traces of one such effort. It
united two different notions of objective reason in the hope that the flaws of each would be
cured by the strengths of the other. Late 19th century American legal thought had founded its
legitimacy on the immanent reason of legal doctrine itself: this foundation was undermined by
the Realist critique. To reconstitute the authority of legal scholarship, the Imperial Jurists turned
to science to buttress law's claims to objectivity. They knew, though, that science was not suffi-
cient, because they they saw science as incapable of generating normative conclusions. This para-
dox is that of the Imperial Jurists' version of the law-social science alliance, and why I have
called this project a "marriage of convenience." It proposed to wed a higher law tradition in
which no one really believed and a practice of positive science many realized could not generate
final answers.
81. This countervision can be found in numerous sources. It is present in some of the criti-
cal work being done by law and society scholars, as well in the work of scholars -who identify
with movements such as feminist jurisprudence, critical legal studies, and critical race theory.
For a discussion of critical studies by law and society, see Trubek & Esser, supra note 2, and
Handmaiden's Revenge, supra note 2.
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A. The Emergent Countervision
Where the Imperial Jurists thought law could be easily and con-
sciously deployed as the instrument of a unified and transformative
will, some today see law as fragile, contradictory, fragmentary, and
dispersed. Where Imperial legal culture was objectivist, positing that
scholarship could point toward a "correct" answer to legal questions,
the countervision accepts discursivity and recognizes that scholarship
is an arena of struggle in which various visions compete. Where Impe-
rial lawyers saw clear distinctions between law and society, knowledge
and politics, an authoritative normative tradition and (sometimes) re-
calcitrant social structures, those who embrace the countervision blur
these distinctions, recognize contradiction, and seek to cope with a
complex and contradictory situation.
1. Law as Fragile
As the result of over two decades of gap studies, impact studies,
and implementation research, we have come to doubt the independent
power of law to reshape social arrangements. The law and society
movement has helped us see the fragility of law's grasp on social life.82
Laws are rarely clearcut, so that while "law" may be thought of as
the command of the sovereign, it is often damn hard to figure out just
what the sovereign wants! More importantly, the resistances to mes-
sages encoded in law are often incredibly powerful. Even when new
laws seem relatively clear, those who work with these laws on a day-
to-day basis find the message diluted, if not reversed, by interpretative
struggles, outright denial, and avoidance. It is this sense of fragility
that gives the Post-Imperial Jurist her sense of marginality.
2. A Contradictory, Multi-vocal, Normative Tradition
It turns out that the sovereign more often than not speaks with a
forked tongue. While the Critical Legal Studies movement has done
82. Thus one of the most important aspects of the emergent countervision rests on the rec-
ognition of law's marginality. Where the Imperial scholars saw law as a central and controlling
force in society-a force which was at the same time a repository of Reason and a source of
Will-many contemporary legal scholars have recognized the precarious hold that law has on
social relations. Much of the credit for this realization can be given to law and society scholar-
ship. Ironically, the recognition of marginality is itself a result of the "gap study" project, one
which documented the pervasive and substantial distance between legal pronouncement and so-
cial behavior. See supra note 76 and the sources cited therein. What started as an effort to
strengthen law as hegemonic Will became the source of doubts about law's ability to shape social
relations and of insights into law's dependence on complex networks of social relationships.
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more than anyone to document and explain the normative contradic-
tions embedded in most complex bodies of legal doctrine, many Post-
Imperial lawyers understand-at some level-that there are always
competing precedents, alternative interpretations, and radically differ-
ent social visions in our legal tradition. At least since Duncan Ken-
nedy demonstrated how private law doctrine oscillates between rules
and standards, formality and informality, and individualist and altru-
ist visions of law and society, we have been forced to recognize the
complex and contradictory nature of American law."3
The reasons given for this fact, and the ideas people have about
what to do with or about it, are varied. Some, longing for an imag-
ined past in which law was univocal, might seek newer and better in-
terpretive methods which would fix legal meaning once and for all.
But others revel in the openness and play which contradiction permits.
For those of this persuasion, the fluidity of law is not a problem to be
solved, but an opportunity to be seized. Thus, for example, Roberto
Unger and others in the Critical Legal Studies tradition find in this
situation opportunities for radical scholarship and practice. They call
for "deviationist" doctrinal work in which alternative readings of the
legal tradition are to be produced in an effort to further alternative
moral visions and political projects.8
3. Legal Culture as Fragmentary
The more that post-modernist ideas advance within legal culture,
the more we begin to see law not as a set of determinate commands,
or even as contradictory-yet-structured sets of rules, principles, and
visions, but rather as a series of fragments which are deployed though
a wide range of localized processes or practices. It is no accident that
legal culture is beginning to pay attention to what anthropologists call
"practice theory," a body of thought that sees culture as bits and
pieces of myth, metaphor, and idea which are deployed in moments of
practice.8 5 This anthropological vision fits ver, well with the contem-
83. Kennedy, supra note 74, passim. See also R. UNGER, supra note 30; Gordon, supra note
74.
84. R. UNGER, supra note 30, at 15-22; Gordon, supra note 74, at 198-201. Other more
resolutely post-modern legal scholars want to keep any fixity at bay by simply deconstructing all
interpretations. See, e.g., Kennedy, A Rotation in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, in CaRrcAL
LEGAL TnouoHT: AN AMERiCAN-GERmAN DEBATE 353 (Joerges & Trubek eds. 1989); Kennedy,
Spring Break, 63 TEx. L. Rsv. 1377 (1985); Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REv. 251 (1985).
85. For an application of practice theory to legal studies, see Coombe, supra note 37, at
111-21.
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porary jurists' understanding of the phenomenology of legal decision-
making.86
4. Law and Legal Ideology Dispersed in Society
Imperial Jurists saw law as powerful, univocal, and ultimately co-
herent. At the same time, they imagined law as a unified system made
up of a hierarchy of constitutional norms, statutory rules, judicial in-
terpretations, and common law principles. The law, in short, was the
law. Not only has Post-Imperial legal culture questioned law's power,
univocality, and coherence, it also has come to see law as dispersed
throughout social life.87 We see this view in the notion of law as ideol-
ogy, now a major subject for investigation by law and society scho-
lars. 8 When we conceive of law as ideology, we understand that law
may affect social life not by the imposition of a transformative Will,
but by reinforcing widely-held notions of what is possible or imagina-
ble. Law as ideology is not necessarily just on the books or in "ac-
tion": it is everywhere in social life where action is imagined or not
imagined, taken or not taken.
The view of law as "dispersed" reframes the question of the power
of law. If the law reflects and reinforces ideologies that emanate from
many sources, then it may not be a powerful tool to change society-
as the Imperial Jurists imagined-but may rather have a powerful grip
on society.
The question of whether law is a straitjacket, or just another com-
plex and contradictory arena for struggle, depends on how we see
86. See Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36
J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986). Practice theory has much in common with the concept of "brico-
lage" used by critical legal scholars to describe the complexity and multiplicity of legal activity
while acknowledging its indeterminacy. (Roughly translated, a bricoleur is a handyman, artisan,
or do-it-your-selfer.) The concept, appropriated from structural anthropology, see C. LEvI-
STRAuss, THlE SAVAGE MIND (1966), describes the creation of social reality as shaped by both
subjective intent and the constraints of circumstance. Boyle, supra note 39, at 780 n.270. Dun-
can Kennedy uses the concept of "bricolage" to describe the view that there is no internal coher-
ence or logic to legal ideology; that multiple, institutionally specific structures within legal
doctrine exist, but none are determinate. See Kennedy, Critical Legal Studies in the Work of the
Amherst Seminar 10-11 (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The ways in which
legal actors work within the system and put together available materials as bricoleurs can be
understood through an account of the specific local practices and discourses which both con-
strain and free the actor. See Kennedy, Freedom & Constraint, supra. Cf. Coombe, supra note
37, at 71, 119 (positing that specific local practices must be examined in a broader societal con-
text that includes genealogical accounts of the local production of knowledge).
87. I do not simply refer to ideas like Eugen Ehrlich's famous "living law," the idea of a
local and customary law more powerful than statutes and codes. E. EHRLICH, FuNDAMENTAL
PRIcNIPLs oF aE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1936). These ideas have been with us for a long time,
although the law and society movement did a lot to bring Ehrlich's insights into mainstream
American legal culture.
88. A recent issue of the Law and Society Review was devoted to this topic. See Special
Issue: Law and Ideology, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. (1988).
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power and ideology. While from some perspectives the ideological
view of law makes it seem like a solid bulwark for the status quo, the
law seems open and manipulable from others. This latter view is the
message of "practice theory." If law, albeit ideological, is neither uni-
fied nor structured, and if our legal culture is a series of fragments
whose significance is determined through multiple, often low level,
and frequently local practices of interpretation and decision, then at-
tention naturally turns to the many sites and moments of practice, and
the opportunities for transformative action they provide.
5. Law and Legal Scholarship as Arenas of Struggle
The idea that both law and legal scholarship are "arenas of strug-
gle" appears in the literatures of Post-Imperial legal culture and is a
central feature of the emerging countervision. Even if they have aban-
doned the Imperial epoch's vision of law as a univocal source of pro-
gressive values and a privileged instrument for social change, those
who embrace this vision have not given up on law as a site for trans-
formative action. These anti-Imperial Scholars still believe that law
makes a difference and that struggles in and about the law are worth-
while. But they have no illusions that the law contains immanent prin-
ciples of freedom and equality which can and will be worked pure,
thus guaranteeing emancipation. On the contrary, they expect and of-
ten find in the law strands of the same racism, sexism, and elitism that
they are struggling against in social life.8 9 Yet at the same time, many
do not see in the law a rigid structure of oppression, hierarchy, and
domination. Because the law is fragile, contradictory, fragmented,
and dispersed, it guarantees nothing. But, by the same token, nothing
is impossible. Victories in law do not necessarily lead to changes else-
where, but they are victories all the same.
6. Living in the Contradiction
Those who see law as fragile, contradictory, fragmentary, and dis-
persed have blurred the clean lines between law and society that
marked Imperial legal culture and influenced the original understand-
ing. Further, they have obscured the distinction between the construc-
tion of social knowledge and the transformation of society. Some may
see these people as confused and muddle-headed, but I do not. The
emerging countervision is a way of living with, and taking advantage
89. D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); C.
MAcKINNoN, FEhnINSM UNMODITD (1987); Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539
(1989) (minority feminist scholarship).
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of, a series of contradictions that exist in our culture. We live in a
society that believes in law and whose legal tradition contains many
progressive values. We live in a society that believes in the power of
knowledge and the authority of scholarship. At the same time, ours is
a society in which hierarchies of class, race, and gender persist and
influence the operations of the law and the production of scholarship.
For those scholars who embrace progressive values and grasp the con-
tradictions in our society, there is room for maneuver. Legal doctrine
can be deployed for normative argument, legal studies can foster pro-
gressive visions, legal victories can advance worthy causes. But every-
thing is partial, tentative, and limited. Imperial Jurists might
denounce this stance as hesitant and confused, but then look what a
mess they have left us!
B. Post-Imperial Academic Projects in Law
Anyone who surveys the current legal academic scene must note the
degree to which competing moral and social visions animate academic
law. These visions underlie and energize the competing schools that
have emerged in the normative vacuum created by the decline of the
hegemony of Imperial legal culture. Whereas legal scholarship once
seemed all of a piece, numerous self-proclaimed movements in legal
thought today are organized more or less as "projects," much as the
law and society movement is organized.
One of the reasons that I call the current movement in legal culture
"Post-Imperial" is that it has allowed the emergence of varied pro-
jects of this kind. A complete catalogue would require an article in
itself. Some are familiar: law and economics, critical legal studies, and
feminist jurisprudence are well known. However, even these move-
ments are far from unified; within each there are competing tenden-
cies and divergent strands. Moreover, there are other emerging
groups, such as the critical race theory movement founded in 1989. 90
This proliferation of scholarly projects gives contemporary academic
law its sense of vitality and movement. 9'
90. The Critical Race Theory Workshop, a thriving project which originated at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin (July 1989), brings together new work of minority legal scholars in the critical
tradition. These scholars seek to develop a medium for people of color to think, write, and
challenge from their experiences of racism and the politics of exclusion.
91. They also have caused alarm in the bar. Lawyers have expressed concern over the "aca-
demization" of the law schools. They may fear either that the new movements are irrelevant-
because they employ sophisticated forms of academic discourse from economics to post-structur-
alism unfamiliar to practitioners-or too relevant because at least some challenge the role of law
and lawyers in our society. See Middleton, Legal Scholarship: Is It Irrelevant?, 11 Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 9, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
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The Law and Society Association was the first of these "academic
projects" in the law. It sought to create a new object for legal scholar-
ship and to employ new methods in the study of law. It sought au-
thority within the legal field on the explicit grounds of the objectivity
of science and the utility of its knowledges. But at the same time, it
gained added legitimacy because of its tacit alliance with those who
furthered the progressive legal reform agendas of the Imperial Age:
the civil rights movement, the War on Poverty, the Warren Court's
rights revolution.
The current academic scene presents challenges to the law and soci-
ety movement and requires it to rethink the rationale for its activities.
To the extent that law and society scholarship rests on objectivist
claims, it is challenged by movements in legal studies like law and eco-
nomics. The latter movement has taken on the mantle of science and
objectivism, while tacitly giving support to neo-conservative ideas that
are currently much in vogue in American culture. This form of legal
scholarship finds support from elite lawyers, conservative university
administrators, and New Right publicists and foundations. Perhaps as
a result of its double commitment to objectivism and conservative
views on society, law and economics has had more success colonizing
the legal academy than the law and society movement ever did.
On the other hand, critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, and
critical race theory have seized the flag of progressive politics. These
movements combine an explicit commitment to a more radical social
vision with sophisticated use of social theory. They have analysed and
critiqued the role of law in American society, seeking to show how the
law works to preserve race, class, and gender hierarchies.9
Social Scientists Reflect on Law Schools
Recently, I organized a session for the Law and Social Science
Section of the Association of American Law Schools. The topic was
"Can Social Scientists Survive in Law Schools?" The panel included
social scientists who teach in major law schools and have
championed the use of social science in legal education and
scholarship. I asked each to talk about their own experiences in law
schools: I expected most to be upbeat but some to be critical. To my
surprise, no one told a really favorable story. All agreed that social
scientists could "survive" in the legal academy, but only by a series
of adaptive measures that threatened to undermine the original
92. The progressive movements are more marginal than law and economics, but they have
found support from a variety of people, including law students, public-interest lawyers, and
people in social movements.
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purpose of the alliance of law and social science. They suggested that
if social scientists could demonstrate mastery of traditional doctrinal
fields and provide information useful to lawyers in practice, they
would be successful law teachers. But these social scientists agreed
that it was much harder to introduce critical insights about law
drawn from the social disciplines or to get students to think critically
and holistically about the role of law in society. One panelist-who
has taught in a major law school for 25 years-said the real question
was whether social science could "prosper" in the law school.
One member of the audience recounted an unsuccessful effort to
teach the anthropology of law to JD students. After a class in which
they had discussed forms of dispute resolution in an African tribe, a
student said to her: "Look, professor, I know I'm never going to
represent the Nuer, so why I should learn about them?" Most of us
felt a shock of recognition: we each could tell similar stories. We
thought: that student's narrow vision contains the whole history of
law and society in law schools. We sympathized with the professor.
But a few wondered: Why do we care about the Nuer?
VI. LAW AND SOCIETY: BACK TO THE FUTURE?
Perhaps the original law and society understanding is fading, but
the "law and society idea" remains. The movement has succeeded in
reconceptualizing law as a domain for social inquiry. More people are
using the social disciplines in the study of law than ever before. As a
result, the Law and Society Association has grown and has inspired
similar enterprises in other countries.
Nonetheless, the movement faces difficult choices. The tacit union
of objectivist knowledge and progressive politics has come unstuck.
No clear alternative has emerged. Efforts to rethink the original un-
derstanding have given law and society scholarship some of its recent
energy, but the critical effort seems to have reached a sticking point.
Even the boldest voices within the movement hesitate to abandon ob-
jectivism fully and embrace discursivity. Even more radical law and
society scholars hesitate to forge alliances with progressive movements
in academic law: the power of old paradigms and old alliances seems
strong. There is a fear of going too far. In this part I shall comment
on the revisionary effort, analyze the "sticking point," and suggest
one path the movement might take.
A. Vitality
It is important at the start to recognize that the movement remains
active and vital. Something holds it together and generates continued
investments of scholarly energy in the enterprise. Viewed in the light
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of the resistance which law and society has encountered, and the dis-
appointments it has experienced, this continued energy and persistent
investment is a sign of hope.
Of course, energy and continued investment do not necessarily
prove the movement has a future. They could reflect nostalgia for a
past in which the movement was smaller and there were fewer doubts
about the purpose of the enterprise. 93 They could be the result of fear
of the future and a desperate search for community.9
Yet the law and society movement and its Association seem to be
something more than a club for veterans of past academic wars or a
salon des refuses. The pioneers did accomplish something lasting. It is
no small achievement to have constituted a new object of inquiry in
legal studies, legitimating exploration of law as structure, system, and
behavior. It was a major accomplishment to open legal studies to pro-
fessional social scientists. And it was no mean feat for a basically lib-
eral movement of social science intellectuals to gain a foothold in the
generally anti-intellectual and often politically conservative environ-
ment of the American law school. There was, indeed, a lot to cele-
brate at the twenty-fifth anniversary party.
B. Tentative Steps at Revision: "Critical Empiricism"
Nostalgia, however, is not enough. The movement must go for-
ward, and that means challenging the past as well as celebrating it.
This work is well underway: law and society scholars have already be-
gun to rethink the original understanding and develop new ways to
continue fruitful investigations of law as a social phenomenon. Law-
yers and social scientists are rethinking their own practices and discov-
ering new reasons to work together. This Essay, which culminates a
series of studies of this nature, is such an effort.91 But the most sus-
tained collective endeavor of this type is the project carried out largely
by scholars associated with the Amherst Seminar on Legal Process
93. As the opening story suggests, nostalgia is an important aspect of the law and society
movement. In part, it may simply reflect the aging process: almost all the pioneers of law and
society are still active, but many are now in their 50's and 60's and naturally want to look back
with satisfaction on their past efforts.
94. One of the few things that all law and society scholars have in common is the feeling
that they are marginal somewhere else. While law has been accepted as a legitimate object of
study in many social disciplines, the practitioners of these sub-specialities (e.g., anthropology of
law, history of law, public law, psychology of law, sociology of law) are rarely treated as central
actors in their parent disciplines. At the same time, the small group of law and society devotees
in law schools find themselves caught between the narrow professionalism that has always hin-
dered their progress, and the adepts of the newer academic projects which seem to be gaining
converts and attracting the younger generation.
95. See supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
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and Legal Ideology: John Esser and I have dubbed this effort "critical
empiricism.'"'
The "critical empiricists" have challenged major aspects of the
original understanding. They recognize the discursive nature of socio-
legal knowledge, question the use of law as a standard for normative
critique, and show how law and society research has at times legiti-
mated dubious policies. But this partial critique of the original under-
standing reflects some hestitations, and the project is marked by some
contradictions.
The first contradiction is between a recognition of discursivity and
an apparent desire for disengagement. One can find the same people
arguing that social knowledge constructs the world and that law and
society scholarship should become even more disengaged from policy
concerns than it is now 7 The second contradiction is between the ap-
propriation of post-structuralist ideas like anthropological "practice
theory" and the continued search for structural causes and systemic
explanations. Thus, one can find in the work of the Amherst Seminar
both the view that legal and social life are constructed through numer-
ous local and ad hoc practices or processes, 98 and a faith that socio-
legal knowledge can unearth the deep "structural" or material causes
of behavior.9
In addition to these intellectual tensions, the critical scholars in the
law and society movement are ambivalent about the relationship be-
tween their project and critical movements in the legal academy. The
law and society movement has paid attention to critical legal studies,
feminist jurisprudence, and critical race theory. Work from these tra-
ditions is cited, and people associated with these movements partici-
pate in the work of the Law and Society Association. At the same
time, some law and society scholars have distanced themselves from
the radical movements in legal studies: this distancing is most clearly
apparent in the stance many take toward Critical Legal Studies. 100
96. Trubek & Esser, supra note 2, at 4.
97. This can be seen in the work of Austin Sarat and Susan Silbey. Compare Sarat & Sib-
ley, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW & Soc'y REv. 165 (1987) (asserting
that true understanding will come about only through involvement with and study of new social
environments) with Policy Audience, supra note 54 (arguing for an increased distancing from
social policy). Henrick Hartog has drawn attention to this conflict in the work of the Amherst
group. See Hartog, The End(s) of Critical Empiricism, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 53, 56 (1989).
98. Harrington & Yngvesson, Interpretive Sociolegal Research, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 135
(1990).
99. Brigham & Harrington, Realism and Its Consequences: An Inquiry into Contemporary
Sociological Research, 17 INT'L J. Soc. L. 41, 55-57 (1989). See also HARRINGTON, SHADOW
JUSTICE: Tin IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATrvES TO COURT (1985).
100. For a discussion of the ambivalent relationship between the critical empiricists and
CLS, see Trubek & Esser, supra note 2, at 31-34.
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C. The Sticking Point: Objectivism and Disciplinary Competence
While some critical empiricists are ready to jettison some of the ele-
ments of the original understanding altogether, many have hesitated
'to abandon fully three ideas: (1) that social structures are governed by
regular laws; (2) that some form of certifiable knowledge of society is
possible; and (3) that law and society work should be disengaged from
moral aspirations and political commitment.
Behind these hesitations I think we can find a single sticking
point-namely the unwillingness to abandon some form of objectiv-
ism. What explains this reluctance? It seems to me that this sticking
point has emerged because objectivism has been the main argument
supporting social science's claim to authority within the legal field.
Law and society scholars have invested a lot in the claim that they can
provide certifiable knowledge that legal scholarship needs but that
lawyers cannot get on their own. This epistemological faith legitimates
social science within legal discourse and gives social scientists a claim
to exclusive jurisdiction over a legally relevant area of knowledge.
Having fought so hard to constitute an object of legitimate legal
knowledge to which only they can speak, law and society scholars are
loath to give it up. The movement has succeeded in changing legal
culture to the point where the legal academy accepts the importance of
studying law as a system or a reflection of social structure, as purpo-
sive instrument, or as patterned behavior. And the movement has se-
cured support for the view that those with professional social science
credentials (and a few self-taught lawyers allowed into the club on suf-
ferance) have privileged access to these new domains of legal knowl-
edge. Because the social scientists' claims were based on the certifiable
nature of the knowledge they would produce, abandoning objectivism
might be giving up professional jurisdiction. 0'
This fear is not idle. Law and society's success in constituting new
objects of inquiry is fragile: legal culture is constantly pulled back to-
ward doctrine and policy and away from structure and behavior. I
think the critical empiricists know that it is possible to retain the
newly constructed objects of legal knowledge while abandoning objec-
tivism. But they may fear that the law schools will not accept this
divorce of systemicity and objectivism, so that if they express doubts
about objectivism, they will undermine legal interest in the new ob-
jects of study.
101. For a discussion of how professions construct claims to exclusive jurisdiction over areas
of knowledge or practice, see generally A. ABBOT, TmE SYSTEM OF PROFEsSIONS: AN ESSAY ON
TlE DIvISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988).
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These fears, and the hesitations they may explain, are not un-
founded. But there is an irony and a danger to the continued search
for grounded knowledge. Objectivism and the idea of disengagement
which seems to accompany it are two-edged swords for the law and
society movement. They may seem to be a way to preserve the social
scientist's exclusive jurisdiction over the newer objects of knowledge,
but it is unclear that this strategy will work. Law and society scholars
will find themselves confronting law and economics which also rests
its claim on objectivism and has simpler, more agreeable stories to tell
lawyers. On the other hand, objectivism and disengagement will segre-
gate law and society from the progressive academic projects in law.
Adepts of these movements all accept the importance of studying law
as structure and behavior, but most see social knowledge as discursive
and scorn disengagement. 1 2
D. Back to the Future?
What I have called the original law and society "understanding" is
losing its grip. It is no longer the exclusive, nor even the dominant,
vision within the movement. There is no reason why a new under-
standing cannot be developed and the movement's role in legal studies
redefined for the 1990's and beyond. The law and society idea can be
reconstructed, law and society scholars' claims to competence in legal
studies redefined, and the Association and other support institutions
reoriented accordingly.
One path that could be taken would turn the movement more syste-
matically towards critical evaluation of the role of law in American
society and the development of projects and programs that would em-
power the disadvantaged in our society and place us on a trajectory
102. Because epistemological issues are related to questions of professional and institutional
competence, they overlap with some of the institutional questions which divide the movement.
Many scholars believe that if law and society scholarship is to secure more authority in American
culture, it must clarify its audience and secure its academic base. But there is no agreement on
how this security could be accomplished or what paths are likely to work. Some see the law
schools as the logical base, and the legal profession as the primary audience. Others reject this
approach, arguing that law and society scholars can survive within the law schools only by ac-
cepting the role of a technical handmaiden in the administration of justice, or even by "going
native" and becoming quasi-lawyers. Disillusioned with legal education and the narrow profes-
sionalism of law students and most law faculties, they have suggested that the movement find its
base in interdisciplinary centers or departments of legal studies. Granted, this idea is attractive.
But while there has been some movement in this direction, it is unlikely that many colleges or
universities will provide the needed support, because they remain unclear about what kinds of
students such centers would train and uncertain that the scholarship produced in such venues
would command respect within the legal field. Those who try to chart the movement's institu-
tional future find themselves between a rock and a hard place.
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towards more fundamental social change. 0 3 Such a move would facili-
tate closer relations between the law and society movement and law-
yers and legal scholars who are working in this direction.1 4 It would
restore the original alliance between law and society scholarship and
progressive politics.
1. Reversing Field
I would find such a move welcome. But for this alliance to occur, it
would be necessary to complete the revision of the original under-
standing begun by the critical empiricists. To accomplish that, we
should "reverse field"-that is, go back to the original understanding
and complete the revision of its elements. This reconstruction would
preserve the original object of inquiry which law and society created
and would maintain social science's claim to competence-although
not to a sphere of exclusive jurisdiction-in the legal field. But the
reconstruction would configure the objects in ways that are more
compatible with the emerging legal countervision, thus facilitating an
alliance between progressive social thinkers in law and like-minded
folks in law and society. Reversing field, in this sense, means making
five basic moves.
(a) From Closed to Open Systems
The basic idea that both law and society should be thought of as
systems is an enduring insight onto which we should hold. But we first
have to transform our understanding of what a "system" is by recog-
nizing the open and potentially malleable nature of social systems.
(b) From Positive to Discursive Science
Some think that the very label "science" is a trap and should be
jettisoned. It implies an epistemological rupture between specialized
and ordinary knowledge. This label carries with it the aura of objec-
tivism and determinist laws of social life. Sometimes I worry about
such matters, but most of the time I do not. (A rose by any other
103. These objectives would parallel the aspirations of the "new" public interest law. See L.
Trubek, Critical Lawyering: An Outline of the "New" Public Interest Law, Center for Public
Representation Policy Paper, Jan. 1990 (available from the Center for Public Representation,
Madison, WI).
104. Moves toward an alliance between law and society and critical academic movements
(e.g., feminist legal theory, critical legal studies, critical race theory) are already underway, sug-
gesting that the path suggested may be adopted. Of course, I do not expect swift or dramatic
change. The movement will continue to be, as it has been in the past, eclectic and tolerant of
many voices; the Association, as it should, will remain open to all who want to affiliate.
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name, etc.) I recognize that many of the techniques and methods that
we have developed in our quest for objectivity are useful and impor-
tant even for those who recognize the socially constructed nature of
the knowledges we produce: not making it up; not taking one event as
evidence of a trend; demanding intersubjective validation, etc. I want
to hold onto much of the tradition of empirical study of law and think
the law and society movement is worth preserving for that reason
alone. I just want us to explicitly acknowledge the responsibility we
have for the knowledge we chose to produce and the uses to which it
is put.
(c) From Disengagement to Social Responsibility
I want us to stop thinking of ourselves as white-coated experts who
command a specialized and purer knowledge which we produce for no
end except the truth, and to recognize that we are moral and political
actors engaged in a process of social transformation and struggle. I
want us to acknowledge our visions and commitments openly and to
bear the individual and collective responsibility such acknowledge-
ment entails.
(d) From Legal Hegemony to Moral Democracy
I want the movement to abandon its naive faith in law as a source
of normative guidance. I want us to recognize that social visions are
the source of our deepest personal identity and meaning, and that as
citizens and scholars we must struggle to realize those visions we indi-
vidually and collectively accept. I would like to see normative debate
become an open and central aspect of our collective interactions.
(e) From Tacit to Open Commitment
It is my view that law and society has always been a transformative
political project. It has identified with the dispossessed and the mar-
ginal in American life. It has recognized that America harbors racism,
sexism, and elitism. It has favored civil rights, supported efforts to
eradicate poverty, and challenged patriarchal relationships. It has
tried, at times, to speak for those marginal groups and interests in our
society who lack a voice in the "higher" culture of law and social
science. I want us to continue this advocacy, but forcefully and more
openly. I want us to continue to speak out, but to do so in a more
assertive and different voice.
2. Conclusion
When it started, law and society presented itself as pursuing objec-
tive knowledge while also seeking to support progressive reforms in
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the law. When the movement's message was progressive, it spoke to
many in the law. But when the movement moved away from the lib-
eral agenda and continued the search for objective knowledge for its
own sake, its voice became abstract and disembodied. It lost its appeal
to many of the bolder minds in law and the social sciences. We began
to talk about the Nuer in a vacuum. Today, we have a chance to rede-
fine our role and recreate the alliance with progressive groups in both
the academy and the society. There is renewed interest in issues of
racism, sexism, and poverty in American society. There is a resur-
gence of hope for the pursuit of social change in the law. There is talk
of a "new" public interest law. These are things about which the law
and society movement has traditionally spoken. It is time to go back
to the future.

